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T HE problem of assuring the fidelity of corporate insiders
1 to 
the public investors in their enterprises figured prominently 
in legal literature and law reform proposals twenty-five or thirty 
years ago. In recent years, that question has attracted relatively 
less attention-in part because of the appearance or recognition 
of more significant problems in the relationship of publicly-held 
corporate enterprise to the national well-being, but in part also 
because of the development by courts, legislatures and adminis-
trative agencies-and to some extent by the insiders' community 
itself-of more exacting standards of loyalty. Recognition of 
broader obligations to their corporations2 and to public investors3 
has meant redefinition of "improper" or "wrongful" conduct to 
include many kinds of behavior theretofore thought permissible, 
• Member of the New York Bar.-Ed. 
1 The scope of the term "insiders" varies somewhat with the context in which it is 
used. Unless otherwise indicated, the term when used hereinafter denotes officers, 
directors, and persons owning a sufficient quantity of a corporation's securities, or other-
wise, to be deemed fairly to be able to command inside knowledge of and to exercise 
effective influence in its affairs. 
2 See, e.g., Israels, The Implications and Limitations of the "Deep Rock" Doctrine, 
42 CoLUM. L. REv. 376 (1942); Symposium on Conflicts of Interest, 17 Bus. LAw. 42 
(1961). 
3 E.g., the expansion, both at common law and by reason of rule X-I0B-5 (now 
rule IOb-5) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, of the requirement that insiders disclose relevant facts affecting 
the value of the corporation's securities to those with whom they deal in such securities. 
See Cady, Roberts &: Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1! 76803 (1961); Daum &: Phillips, 
The Implications of Cady Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939 (1962). Developments in this area 
are discussed in BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 80 (2d ed. 1946); 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGU-
LATION 1446-74 (2d ed. 1961); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 690-705 (2d ed. 1949); Conant, Duties 
of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960); 
Note, SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchases of Securities, 59 HARv. L. REv. 769 
(1946); Note, Civil Liability Under Rule X-IOB-5, 42 VA. L. REv. 537 (1956); Comment, 
The Prospects for Rule X-JOB-5; An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Stockholders, 
59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950). See Annots., 132 A.L.R. 260 (1940); 84 A.L.R. 615 (1933). 
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if not entirely proper. And it also has impelled the use of pro-
phylactic rules to enforce those enlarged definitions; so that even 
though certain types of activity may not be wrongful or cause in-
jury on every occasion when indulged in, they are nevertheless 
proscribed broadly, both for administrative reasons and in defer-
ence to the recurrent, if not uniformly held, notion that a cor-
porate insider must be not only virtuous but above suspicion. 
Insider dealings in securities of their corporations have been 
deemed a particularly appropriate area for such rigorous rules. 
Since 1934, Congress has made insiders accountable, without fault 
or proof of harm to anyone, for profits from "trading" in stock 
of corporations whose stock is listed on a securities exchange4 and 
in all securities of public utility holding companies and their 
subsidiaries and of registered closed-end investment companies.5 
In Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, Congress struck, with addi-
tional sanctions covering a limited group of insiders, 6 not merely 
at "trading," but at any purchases or sales of any kind of security 
or claim during an insolvency reorganization. And, in reorganiza-
tions under the Holding Company Act, the Securities and Ex-
4 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 
(1958). "Trading" is defined for purposes of this and related legislation as purchases and 
sales or sales and purchases within any period of less than six months. "Insider" means 
director, officer or beneficial owner of more than 10% of any class of stock registered on 
a national securities exchange. 
5 Section 17(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 830, 
15 U.S.C. § 79q(b) (1958). "Insiders" consist only of officers and directors, since controlling 
stockholders are, by definition, holding companies, subject to regulation. Section !I0(f) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 836, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(f) (1958). 
"Insiders" include officers, directors, beneficial owners of more than 10% of any security 
(other than short-term paper), members of an advisory board, investment advisers, and 
affiliates of investment advisers. 
6 Sections 212, 249 of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 895, 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 612, 
649 (1958). Section 212 authorizes the reorganization court to "limit any claim or 
stock acquired by • • . [any agent, attorney, indenture trustee or committee] • • • in 
contemplation or in the course of the proceeding under this chapter to the actual 
consideration paid therefor." Section 249 provides in relevant part that "no compensation 
or reimbursement shall be allowed to any committee or attorney, or other person acting 
in the proceedings in a representative or fiduciary capacity, who at any time after 
assuming to act in such capacity has purchased or sold . • • claims [against] or stock" 
of the debtor. Corporate officers and employees of the debtor in possession have been 
held to be outside the scope of § 249, if not also of § 212. In re Nazareth Fairgrounds 
& Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted .sub nom. Wolf v. Wein• 
stein, 369 U.S. 837 (1962). For comprehensive discussions of the operation of these provi-
sions, see Bandier, Securities Trading and Fee Sharing Under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy 
Act, 15 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 230 (1960); Ferber, Blasberg & Katz, Conflicts of Interest in 
Reorganization Proceedings Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act and Chapter 
X of the Bankruptcy Act, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 319 (1959); Note, 45 VA. L. REv. 1065 
(1959). 
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change Commission, albeit with some backing and filling, appears 
to have adopted a comparable position in its rules and rulings.7 
However varied may be the sanctions enforcing it, the basic effort 
in all such instances is to discourage all insider securities dealings, 
even if innocent, in the specified contexts. Sanctions are imposed 
whether or not the insider was in fact influenced in conducting 
corporate affairs by the possibility of obtaining trading profits for 
himself, and whether or not the corporation or its security hold-
ers were in fact injured by his administration of its affairs or 
misled or overreached by his dealings in its securities. 
The unusual breadth of the restrictions thus imposed, which 
have recently been receiving narrowing judicial interpretation,8 
and the apparent anomaly of making the insider accountable to 
the corporation rather than to the persons with whom he deals 
do not, at least a priori, invite extension of those restrictions to 
insider securities dealing in other contexts. On the other hand, 
inquiry into the propriety of such extension is suggested by the 
increasing incidence of various kinds of corporate readjustments 
which, in relevant respects, present the same problems as insol-
vency reorganization, e.g., corporations selling their assets and 
seeking reinvestment opportunities, mergers, voluntary recapital-
izations and liquidations. Similar considerations are evoked by 
the growth of the "over-the-counter" markets,0 on which insiders 
7 See Ferber, Blasberg 8e Katz, supra note 6, at 364-68. Compare United Corp., 37 
S.E.C. 187, 194-95 (1956), enforcement rev'd on other grounds, 249 F.2d 168 (3d Cir. 
1957), and Electric Power 8e Light Corp., 33 S.E.C. 348, 355-59 (1952), enforcement 
rev'd on other grounds, 210 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 348 
U.S. Ml, amended, 349 U.S. 910 (1955), with International Hydroelectric Sys., 37 S.E.C. 
297, !104-05 (1956); Long Island Lighting Co., 34 S.E.C. 600, 618-20, aff'd on that point 
(E.D.N.Y. 1953); Eastern Gas 8e Fuel Associates, .35 S.E.C. 150, 157-58, enforcement 
denied in part, 120 F. Supp. 460 (D. Mass. 1953), enforcement ordered, 218 F.2d 308 
(1st Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 949 (1955). Compare also In re Federal Water 8e 
Gas Corp., 28 S.E.C. 174 (1948), enforced, 87 F. Supp. 289 (D. Del. 1949), direct cert. 
denied, 340 U.S. 8!11 (1951), aff'd, 188 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 
94!! (1952), and Federal Water Serv. Corp. (Chenery litigation), 8 S.E.C. 893, 915-21 
(1941), rev'd, 128 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1942), reversal aff'd and case remanded to SEC, 
318 U.S. 80 (1943), decision on remand, 18 S.E.C. 2!11 (1945), rev'd, 154 F.2d 6 (D.C. 
Cir. 1946), SEC order reinstated, 332 U.S. 194 (1947), and Derby Gas 8e Elec. Corp., 
9 S.E.C. 686, 707-08 (1941), with Standard Gas 8e Elec. Co., 34 S.E.C. 80, 114-15 (1952), 
Middle W. Corp., 27 S.E.C. 195 (1947), enforced, 76 F. Supp. 63 (D. Del. 1948), American 
States Util. Corp., 26 S.E.C. 718 (1947), and Cities Serv. Co., 26 S.E.C. 678 (1947). 
B See, e.g., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); In re Nazareth Fairgrounds 8e 
Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted sub nom. Wolf v. Wein-
stein, 369 U.S. 8!17 (1962). 
o For a discussion of the development of the over-the-counter markets, and citation 
to the repeated efforts to obtain legislation to extend many of the regulatory features 
4 M1cHIGAN LAW REvmw [Vol. 61 
can trade free of the restrictions of section l 6(b) of the Exchange 
Act. 
I. DOCTRINAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE 
OF INSIDER AccOUNTABILITY WITHOUT FAULT 
The historical development of accountability for profits from 
such insider dealings even when no fault or injury is shown re-
flects the various interests sought to be protected and the kinds 
of behavior sought to be discouraged. Long before the New Deal 
legislation, courts had evolved from the law of trusts the notion 
that a corporate officer or director could not enforce at face value 
claims against his corporation which he had purchased at a dis-
count while it was insolvent and on the verge of, or in, bank-
ruptcy or liquidation.10 The resulting restriction to recovery only 
of the insider's cost, and occasionally of interest and expenses, 
was later applied to debt securities11 as well as to trade or com-
mercial claims and judgments12 acquired during various forms of 
insolvency liquidation or reorganization. The limitations so im-
of the Securities Exchange Act, including § 16(b), to the larger corporations whose 
stocks are traded on over-the-counter markets but not on registered exchanges, see 
2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1149-52, 1277-87 (2d ed. 1961). See also Berman, 
Regulation of Unlisted Securities, Financial Analysts J., July-Aug. 1961, p. 45. The 
current investigation by the Securities &: Exchange Commission of securities markets is 
also examining the question of extending the scope of regulation of the over-the-counter 
markets. 
10 E.g., Mothershead v. Douglas, 215 Ark. 519, 221 S.W .2d 424 (1949); Holland v. 
Heyman &: Bro., 60 Ga. 174 (1878); Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land &: Lumber Co., 
26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 1179-80, 83 S.W. 599, 602 (Ct. App. 1904), modified, 27 Ky. L. Rep. 
156, 84 S.W. 545 (Ct. App. 1905). See also Chouteau Ins. Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286, 291 
(1881); Buckley v. Whitcomb, 121 N.Y. 107, 111-12, 24 N.E. 13, 14 (1890). In some cases, 
although the courts rely on the broad principle referred to in the text, the facts might 
well justify the same result on the narrower ground that the insider's behavior was 
otherwise demonstrably wrongful, e.g., Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616 (1874); Canton 
Roll &: Mach. Co. v. Rolling Mill Co., 168 Fed. 465 (4th Cir. 1909); Bonney v. Tilley, 
109 Cal. 346, 42 Pac. 439 (1895); Lingle v. National Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 109 (1869); cf. 
Billings v. Shaw, 209 N.Y. 265, 103 N.E. 142 (1913). 
11 In re Van Sweringen Co., 119 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 
671 (1942) (§ 77B); In re Philadelphia &: W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946) 
(§ 77B); In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941) (§ 77B); cf. 
In re Inland Gas Corp., 187 F.2d 813, 818 (6th Cir. 1951). But cf. In re New York Rys., 
82 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 687 (1936); In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 
1, 5 (D. Del. 1935). 
12 In re Bridgford Co., 237 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1005 
(1957) (ch. XI and bankruptcy); Monroe v. Scofield, 135 F.2d 725 (10th Cir. 1943) 
(bankruptcy); In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 
U.S. 625 (1940) (state receivership and § 77B); In re Jersey Materials Co., 50 F. Supp. 428 
(D.N.J. 1943) (bankruptcy); In re McCrory Stores, 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). 
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posed13 contrast with the insider's relatively undisputed freedom 
otherwise to enforce claims purchased at a discount14 when he 
has no special duty to purchase them for the corporation.15 This 
difference has been rested on the premise that bankruptcy (or 
insolvency culminating in liquidation) works a material change 
in the insider's functions and duties which makes him equivalent 
to a trustee for claimants against, or agent for, the corporation.16 
13 More severe sanctions against such dealing, such as denial of compensation or 
subordination of claims were imposed upon other fiduciaries such as protective com-
mittees and their attorneys. E.g., Marquette Manor Bldg. Corp., 97 F.2d 733 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 648 (1938); In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300, 303 
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), aff'd, ll8 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 
F. Supp. 823, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 83 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1936); 
cf. Missouri Pac. R.R., 217 I.C.C. 671, 675 (1937) (reorganization). 
14 From time to time, on the analogy to express trustees, language, and occasionally 
rulings, appear in the cases suggesting a categorical prohibition against insider enforce-
ment at face value of any claims acquired at a discount, even though acquired when 
the corporation is solvent and able to pay. See Davis v. Rock Creek L.F. &: M. Co., 55 
Cal. 359, 364 (1880); Telegraph v. Lee, 125 Iowa 17, 98 N.W. 364 (1904); McDonald v. 
Haughton, 70 N.C. 393, 399 (1874); Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 470, 97 
A.2d 870 (1953); Hill v. Frazier, 22 Pa. 320 (1853). See also Allen-Foster-Willett Co. v. 
Willett, 227 Mass. 551, 556, ll6 N.E. 875, 876 (1917); Duncomb v. New York H. &: N.R. 
Co., 84 N.Y. 190, 202 (1881). See generally Lake, The Use for Personal Profit of 
Knowledge Gained While a Director, 9 MISS. L.J. 427, 439-43 (1937). However, under 
the predominant case law, in apparent recognition of the economic and social differences 
generally obtaining between claims against express trusts and corporate obligations 
or debt securities [see, e.g., Inglehardt v. Thousand Island Hotel Co., 32 Hun 377, 
383 (Sup. Ct. 1884), rev'd, 109 N.Y. 454 (1888)] the insider is free to enforce at par 
matured claims (and, a fortiori, unmatured claims) purchased at a discount while the 
corporation is solvent, unless in doing so he has violated some special duty to the 
corporation. E.g., Alexandrine Hotel Co. v. Whaling, 313 Mich. 15, 20 N.W.2d 793 
(1945); Punch v. Hipolite Co., 340 Mo. 53, 100 S.W.2d 878 (1936); Seymour v. Spring 
Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333, 342-45, 39 N.E. 365, 366-67 (1895), and cases 
collected in Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d ll72 (1950). See Comment, 1960 DuKE L.J. 613. 
15 Special obligations to the corporation are violated by purchases for the insider's 
own account when he is instructed to purchase for the corporation (Commonwealth 
Fin, Co. v. McHarg, 282 Fed. 560 (2d Cir. 1922); Kroegher v. Calivada Colonizatiqn Co., 
ll9 Fed. 641 (3d Cir. 1902); Kimmel v. Greeting, 2 Grant 125 (Pa. 1853)]; purchases in 
direct competition with a corporate program, as when a special sinking fund has been 
set up [In re Philadelphia &: W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738, 739-40 (E.D. Pa. 1946); 
Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Seymour v. Spring Forest 
Cemetery Ass'n, supra note 14]; or purchases when the corporation is financially able 
to make the purchase (having either the cash or the credit to do so), and presumably, 
in the exercise of sound business judgment, should do so. Wabunga Land Co. v. 
Schwanbeck, 245 Mich. 505, 222 N.W. 707 (1929); Young v. Columbia Land &: Inv. Co., 
53 Ore. 438, 99 Pac. 936 (1909), rehearing denied, 53 Ore. 445, 101 Pac. 212 (1909); see 
Ripperburger v. Allyn, 25 F. Supp. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 
Ill. 301, 385-87, 40 N.E. 362, 387-88 (1895); cf. Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena 
Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 380, 296 Pac. 231, 238 (1931). 
16 See, e.g., In re Philadelphia &: W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738, 740 (E.D. Pa. 1946); In re 
Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 87 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Higgins v. Lansingh, 
supra note 15; Seymour v. Spring Forest Cemetery Ass'n, 144 N.Y. 333, 39 N.E. 365 
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The governing notion, particularly in the earlier cases, is that 
when insolvency liquidation or reorganization is imminent, it 
becomes the duty of corporate officers and directors to attempt to 
settle or discharge the matured or maturing claims against the 
corporation on the most favorable terms, in order to preserve 
assets for, or produce the largest possible distribution of assets or 
new participations to, the remaining claimants. To purchase, or 
attempt to purchase, at a discount, claims which the corporation 
is thus obliged to settle puts the insider in a position of potential-
if not actual-conflict with the best interests of the remaining 
claimants, who have become his beneficiaries. A corporate in-
sider, like an express trustee,17 is to be discouraged from taking 
such a position18 even if the corporation itself is not able to pur-
chase or otherwise settle the claims19 or if the insider's purchase 
will actually benefit the corporation materially.20 This require-
ment of accountability for profits regardless of whether the in-
sider's purchase has injured anyone or indeed even if it has in-
ured to the benefit of other creditors is, of course, designed to 
avert the temptation to do wrong and the appearance of wrong-
doing as well as to prevent actual misconduct. 
But the misconduct against which the rule is directed is not 
only that against which an express trustee is traditionally enjoined, 
i.e., competition with the corporation for the purchase of claims 
at a discount.21 As the later cases indicate, the rule is designed 
(1895); cf. In re Calton Crescent, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 822, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 178 
F.2d 944 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 338 U.S. 304 (1949). 
1'l' BOGERT, TRusrs AND TRUSTEES § 543(d) (2d ed. 1960); R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), 
AGENCY § 388 (1958); R.E5TATEMENT, R.EsrmmoN §§ 190-200 (1937); R.EsTATEMENT, TRUSTS 
§ 170, comments j and k at 368-69, § 203, § 206, comments h and i, at 466 (1959); 2 
ScolT, TRusrs §§ 170.21, 203 (2d ed. 1956); Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 
HAR.v. L. REv. 521, 524-25 (1936). 
18 See, e.g., In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd, 118 F.2d 
405 (3d Cir. 1941); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd 
on other grounds, 83 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1936); Lingle v. National Ins. Co., 45 Mo. 
109 (1869). But cf. R.EsrATEMENT, R.EsrmmoN § 196, comment b (1937). 
19 In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941); cf. Bemer v. 
Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218, 221 (2d Cir. 1949); Regal v. Gulliver, [1942) 
1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.). 
20 In re McCrory Stores, 12 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1935); cf. Bramblet v. Common-
wealth Land &: Lumber Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 83 S.W. 599 (Ct. App. 1904), modified, 
27 Ky. L. Rep. 156, 84 S.W. 545 (Ct. App. 1905). 
21 Although it is acquisition of the claim against the corporation, whether or not 
at a discount, during insolvency, that places the insider in a position of conflict (see 
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17), the case law tends to emphasize the acquisition at a 
discount, in apparent recognition of the evil as the temptation to compete with the 
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also to discourage misconduct by the insider to the liquidation 
or reorganization process for the purpose of facilitating his ad-
vantageous purchases to the possible detriment of the insolvent 
and its other claimants. Denial of profit to insiders "is not imposed 
upon the theory that such profits belong to the corporation by 
reason of any property right that it may have in them but is an 
administrative sanction for the enforcement of the rules of fidu-
ciary conduct set by law."22 On the other hand, the cases often 
suggest that the rule developed by the courts was no more de-
signed than was the law of trusts to benefit those creditors who 
sold their claims to the insiders.23 Its roots in the law of express 
trusts produced the incongruous result that creditors who sold 
their claims were apparently regarded as "claimants" to whom 
little or no fiduciary duty was owed by the insider, while creditors 
who retained their claims became the cestuis for whose benefit 
he was required to act.24 
corporation for an advantageous purchase of the claim. Compare Weissman v. A. 
Weissman, Inc., 374 Pa. 470, 70 A.2d 870 (1953), with Warren v. Wheatley, 231 Ark. 
707, 331 S.W.2d 843 (1960), and Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., 382 Pa. 189, 114 A.2d 
797 (1955). Compare note 15 supra. 
22 In re Philadelphia &: W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also 
Demer v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 174 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1949); cf. McDonald v. 
Haughton, 70 N.C. 393 (1874). Nevertheless it may be noted that apart from the rule 
of insider behavior it is designed to enforce-which could be achieved by a number 
of other sanctions-the notion that the insiders should account to the corporation for 
their profits also reflects the underlying premise that those profits are in some way 
attributable to his use of inside knowledge or power which he holds in a representative 
capacity, and therefore should be shared with those he represents. See, e.g., Dunnett v. 
Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934); Weissman v. A. Weissman, Inc., supra note 21; 
BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17; Hearings on H.R. 4344, 5065 and 5832 Before House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1257 (1942). To 
the extent that accountability is enforced prophylactically, i.e., whether or not inside 
information was actually used, the notion that the insider has made use of a collective 
asset is not entirely adequate to justify the result. 
23 See In re Van Sweringen, 119 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 671 
(1942); In re Norcor Mfg. Co., 109 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 625 
(1941); and In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946); in all 
of which there were indications that the sellers had been overreached by the insiders. 
See also Powell v. Willamette Valley R.R., 15 Ore. 393 (1887); but cf. In re 
Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300, 303 (D. Del. 1936), afj'd, 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 
1941); Boyum v. Jordon, 146 Minn. 66-79, 178 N.W. 158, 163-64 (1920); McDonald v. 
Haughton, supra note 22. 
24' See note 23 supra. The same incongruity is apparent in the denial to assignees 
in bankruptcy of the right to enforce claims purchased by them at a discount. See, 
e.g., Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. Jr. 625 (Ch. 1802); Ex parte James, 8 Ves. Jr. 337 (Ch. 1803); 
United States Fid. &: Guar. Co. v. Eichel, 219 Fed. 803 (3d Cir. 1915); Manhattan Cloak &: 
Suit Co. v. Dodge, 120 Ind. 1, 21 N.E. 344 (1889); In the Matter of Dwight, 61 App. 
Div. 357, 70 N.Y. Supp. 563 (1901), appeal dismissed, 173 N.Y. 583 (1902); cf. Mosser v. 
Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951); Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1921). 
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The principle thus adapted by the courts from the law of 
trusts is one of the sources for the broadside challenge to insider 
transactions embodied in chapter X,25 and in the Securities and 
Exchange Commission's administration of the Holding Company 
Act. But both the reorganization and the anti-trading legislation 
import additional considerations in striking at insider dealings in 
securities. In the evolution from a stricture designed to protect 
relatively well-informed trade or loan creditors of closed corpora-
tions to one designed to protect widely scattered public investors, 
the scope of the attack was expanded. Sanctions were fashioned 
to discourage not merely acquisition at a discount of claims to 
be enforced against the debtor, but trading in securities, in-
cluding equity securities.26 This expansion of the restrictions 
on insider dealing emphasized the effort to avert divided loyalties 
and to eliminate the temptation to make managerial decisions in 
reorganization negotiations (and in the case of section 16(b), in 
corporate affairs generally) with an eye to the impact of such de-
cisions on the prices of corporate securities and the insider's profit-
able purchases, sales or trades.27 This, of course, was designed in 
25 Section 249 of the Bankruptcy Act was said to be "in the main a codification of 
the rule already imposed by the courts in proceedings under § 77B." S. REP. No. 1916, 
75th Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1937). See also Otis & Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp., llO F.2d 
333, 335 (1st Cir. 1940); Testimony of Securities and Exchange Commissioner William O. 
Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 6439, Subsequently Amended and Reintroduced as H.R. 
6439, Before House Committee on Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1937); cf. In re 
Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 340, 345 (3d Cir. 1947). Similarly, although its language is 
merely permissive [cf. In re Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. I (D. Del. 1935)], § 212 has its 
roots in ancient equitable doctrine, from which a more rigid rule of accountability has 
been fashioned judicially. See In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 37 F. Supp. 708, 710 
(S.D. Cal. 1941); and cases cited supra note 11. See also In re Nazareth Fairgrounds &: 
Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 F.2d 678, 684 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted sub nom. Wolf v. Wein-
stein, 369 U.S. 837 (1962); In re McEwen's Laundry, 90 F.2d 872, 873-74 (6th Cir. 1937); 
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL AND 
FvNcrIONS OF PROTEGrIVE AND REORGANIZATION COM!IUTIEES (hereinafter called SEC PRO· 
TEGrIVE COMMITTEE STUDY) pt. VIII, at 119-20 (1938). 
26 See In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738 (E.D. Pa. 1946); compare 
In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300 (D. Del. 1936), aff'd, 118 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 
1941); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), rev'd, 83 F.2d 
406 (2d Cir. 1936). Accountability in such circumstances suggests a broader obligation 
than was generally imposed upon trustees. Compare Prudential Ins. Co. v. Libedar 
Holding Corp., 72 F.2d 395, 397-98 (2d Cir. 1934). 
27 Illustrations of the varied possibilities of insider manipulation of corporate affairs 
or of the reorganization process in order to facilitate profitable dealing for himself 
at the risk of injury to the corporation or its security holders, arc set out in detail in 
the Securities and Exchange Commission's second Chenery decision, In re Federal Water 
Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 248-51 (1945). See also Derby Gas & Elcc. Corp., 9 S.E.C. 
686, 707-08 (1941). That § 16(b) of the Exchange Act was aimed, at least in part, at 
such practices is suggested by many references to them in its legislative history. See, 
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part to protect the corporation and security holders other than 
those dealing with the insider.28 But the legislative pattern also 
reflected explicitly the judgment only rarely intimated by the 
courts-that all insider dealings, however innocent, should be 
discouraged in order to protect persons who were only selectively 
protected by the law of trusts-beneficiaries who sold to, or pur-
chased from, the trustee.29 
This effort to protect those who deal with the insider appears 
to be derived more from the considerations underlying the tradi-
tional disclosure requirements imposed upon a trustee seeking to 
purchase the interest of a cestui, than from the premises on which 
a trustee is forbidden to enforce claims he has purchased at a 
discount. Such disclosure obligations,30 which in any event were 
far from uniformly included among corporate insiders' fiduciary 
obligations when buying or selling securities,31 were apparently 
e.g., Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, Before Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15, at 6555-60 
(1934): S. REP. No. 1445, 73d Cong., 3d Sess. 57-68 (1934); S. REP. No. 792, id. at 9; 
H.R. REP. No. lll83, id. at lll-14. See also report of SEC on PROPOSALS FOR AMENDMENT 
TO SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, made to the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-38 
(1941); Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on 
H.R. 4314, H.R. 5065 and H.R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 1254-60 (1941). 
28 With respect to § 16(b), see note 27 supra. See also Birnbaum v. Newport Steel 
Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463-64 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Silverman v. Re, 
194 F. Supp. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). With respect to the Holding Company Act, see the 
Chenery decisions and others cited note 7 supra. With respect to chapter X, the SEC 
PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY from time to time indicates that protection of those security 
holders with whom the insider does not deal is one of the objectives of prohibiting 
insider trading in contemplation of or during bankruptcy reorganization. See SEC 
PROTECTIVE C0MMITT£E STUDY, pt. II at 517-18, pt. VIII, at 440 (1937). See also Otis &: 
Co. v. Insurance Bldg. Corp., 110 F.2d 333 (1st Cir. 1940): cf. In re Bridgford Co., 237 
F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 1005 (1957): In re Philadelphia W. Ry. 
Co., 64 F. Supp. 738, 741 (E.D. Pa. 1946); In re Los Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. 
Supp. 77, 92 (S.D. Cal. 1941). Compare Meyers, Appellate Review of Attorney Allowances 
in Chapter X Reorganizations, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 1039, 1043-44 (1953). 
29 With respect to chapter X, see testimony of Commissioner William 0. Douglas, 
supra note 25; see also SEC PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE STUDY, pt. III, at 132-52, pt. II, at 
315-51, pt. I, at 155-56 (1937): Note, Conflict of Interests as a Factor in the Allowance of 
Representatives' Claims in Insolvent Corporate Reorganizations, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 1139 
(1958). But cf. Bemer v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218, 220 (2d Cir. 1949). 
That such is among the purposes of § 16(b) is apparent from the face of the provision. 
See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 3d Sess. 8-10 (1934). Similar considerations also 
were authoritative in the administration of the Holding Company Act. See Second 
Chenery decision, In re Federal Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 256 (1915). 
30 See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 17, § 544, at 594; 
RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 170(2), 216 (1959); ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 17, § 216 at 
1149; Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 541-55 (1949). 
31 See authorities cited note 3 supra. 
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deemed insufficient to protect public investors with whom in-
siders "traded" on impersonal securities markets or dealt during 
a bankruptcy reorganization. It was in fair part to overcome the 
necessity for resolving the difficult questions of enforcement and 
of proof which a rule directed only at demonstrated misuse of 
inside information would pose for buyers and sellers of securities 
in publicly-held corporations that the prophylactic principle there-
tofore invoked by courts in related contexts was inserted in section 
16(b) and chapter X.32 
II. RATIONALE OF THE RULE IN p ARTICULAR CONTEXTS 
A. General 
The conclusions thus reached with respect to insiders dealing 
in their corporations' securities are at odds with their freedom 
to deal in such securities under otherwise prevailing norms. Those 
norms generally require proscriptions and remedies to be tailored 
to the evil to be deterred or to the injury to be compensated, 
rather than aimed broadly at behavior which might produce the 
evil or injury feared but is not shown to have done so in fact. 
Thus, they impose liability on the insider for misleading, or at 
most, on fiduciary premises, for failure to make full disclosure to, 
those with whom he deals;33 but they do not make him account-
32 See testimony of Commissioner William 0. Douglas, supra note 25. The SEC 
PROTECTIVE CoMMITIEE STUDY, pt. II, at 341 (1937), after referring to "the difficulty of 
proving that particular purchases or sales were based on inside information" concluded: 
"To purge the committee field of the fundamental and almost irreconcilable conflict of 
interest arising as a result of trading, all purchasing and selling by committee members 
and their affiliated interests should be barred and outlawed. luiy intermediate procedure 
will either involve too great a recession from the ancient standards of trusteeship or be 
too difficult of administrative application." See also Second Chenery decision, In re 
Federal Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 256 (1945); SEC PROTECTIVE COMIIUTTEE STUDY, 
pt. II, at 513.14 (1937); Testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, Hearings on S. Res. 84, 
S. Res. 56 and 97, supra note 27, at 6557. 
33 See note 3 supra. The expanded liability of insiders to those with whom they 
deal is predicated more on fiduciary relationships than on adumbrations from the law 
of fraud. See, e.g., Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P .2d 531 
(1932); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 193 Kan. 333, 31 P .2d 37 (1934); Dawson v. National Life 
Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N.W. 929 (1916); Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 
1041 (1916); cf. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 
(1951); Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). But compare SEC v. Capital 
Gains Bureau, Inc., 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961); Conant, supra note 3. The resulting 
broad disclosure requirement meets a special need to eliminate a kind of bargaining 
inequality which is particularly inappropriate in the securities markets. In those 
markets, in contrast to many other areas in which the public or consumer (as dis• 
tinguished from the specialist) deals, ascertainment of the value of the item traded-
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able in the absence of some such demonstrable misconduct in 
inducing a sale or purchase. Similarly the corporation and other 
security holders are generally protected only from demonstrated 
in jury such as the usurpation of a plainly available corporate op-
portunity, or deliberate wrongdoing such as mismanagement of 
corporate affairs or withholding or inflating dividends in order 
to affect the prices of its securities and so to enable the insiders to 
make advantageous purchases or sales.34 
Over and above the personal interests of insiders, the invest-
ing public has an interest in preserving a fair measure of freedom 
for insiders to invest (and correspondingly to dispose of all or part 
of their investments other than by trading) in their corporations, 
so that, for example, management personnel may be attracted or 
retained or inspired, investors may be left free to seek control or 
to add to their controlling holdings without unnecessary restric-
tions on their liquidity, and to some extent so that the liquidity 
of corporate securities generally may be increased or at least main-
tained. 311 In the absence of special circumstances, such interests 
are generally deemed sufficient to preclude imposition of a rule 
of accountability without fault upon insiders who purchase or sell 
their corporation's securities. Those considerations are felt gen-
erally to outw-eigh the risk of subjecting outsiders to the hazards 
of dealing with insiders who cannot or will not disclose fully the 
relevant knowledge they possess,36 and the corporation to the pos-
i.e., any particular security-tends to be difficult and to require a certain amount of 
study, for which knowledge of, and access to, relevant information are crucial. The 
insider's lawful monopoly of such information and of access thereto creates bargaining 
inequalities which are different from those resulting from disparities of wealth, 
temperament, experience, intelligence, etc., and which, if widespread or uncurbed, make 
impossible "a fair and honest market ..• which would reflect an evaluation of securities 
in the light of all available and pertinent data." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 
231, 235-36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). See also Cady, Roberts &: Co., 
CCH Fro. SEc. L. REP. ~ 76803 (1961). 
34 Sec cases cited note 15 supra. See also Mayflower Hotel Stockholders' Protective 
Comm. v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 173 F.2d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Lesnik v. Public 
Industrial Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 978 (2d Cir. 1944); Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 89-91 
(6th Cir. 1939); Hawley v. Wells, 151 Kan. 539, 99 P.2d 784 (1940); Anderson v. Dyer, 
94 Minn. 30, 101 N.W. 1061 (1904); Hechelman v. Geyer, 248 Pa. 430, 94 Atl. 188 
(1915); White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 Pac. 826 (1921); Note, Freezing Out 
Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1630 (1961). 
811 See SMITH, MANAGEMENT TRADING (1941) for discussion of the possible significance 
of insider trading on liquidity and price structure generally. 
86 Even the requirement of full disclosure of relevant facts often will not entirely 
eliminate the insider's bargaining advantages over those with whom he deals. Apart 
from deliberate failure to meet the disclosure command [cf. Cities Serv. Co., 26 S.E.C. 
678, 690-91 (1947)], enforcement of the requirement against the insider may not be 
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sibility that insiders will, in aid of their personal securities deal-
ings, abuse their power in a manner too subtle to be practicably 
detected. 37 
But the conflict between the need for a fair measure of invest-
ment freedom for insiders and the need for protection of out-
siders and the corporation from abuse of power and knowledge 
by an insider seeking to facilitate his securities dealings does not 
produce the same balance of social convenience in all circum-
stances. The rule embodied in section 16(b) and chapter X (and 
in the case law preceding it) is addressed to the special circum-
stances there described. In the former case, it rests on the differ-
ences that obtain between insider "trading" and, insider "in-
vestment."38 In the latter, it reflects the comparable differences 
between the relationship of the insider to the public security holder 
during normal times and that existing during reorganization or 
liquidation crises, and the relative acuteness of the temptations 
and opportunities for abuse of inside power and knowledge during 
such corporate crises, as distinguished from normal times. 
B. Section 16(b) 
Even on the assumption that increased management invest-
ment in the enterprise will ultimately benefit public investors-
feasible in impersonal markets [but cf. Cady, Roberts & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
,r 76803 (1961)). And in any event some kinds of inside information, e.g., potential but 
uncertain technical advances, trade secrets, intangible and often relatively long range 
estimates or judgments about the particular corporation or the industry with which it 
is connected, may not be communicable effectively to a buyer or seller without raising 
more problems than are solved. See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1148-49 (1950). 
Compare BERLE, STUDIES IN CORPORATION FINANCE 184-88 (1928); BERLE & MEANS, THE 
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 320-25 (1932); Walker, The Duty of 
Disclosure by a Director, 32 YALE L.J. 637 (1923). 
37 See, e.g., Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1939); Dupont v. Dupont, 256 
Fed. 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919); Grubman v. American Gen. Corp., 
130 N.J. Eq. 607, 23 A.2d 578 (1942); Lewin v. New York Ambassador, 189 Misc. 181, 
61 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1946), afj'd, 271 App. Div. 927, 67 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1947); 
Mannheimer v. Keehn, 41 N.Y.S.2d 542, 553-56 (Sup. Ct. 1943), modified on another 
ground, 268 App. Div. 813, 49 N.Y.S.2d 304, amended, 268 App. Div. 845, 51 
N.Y.S.2d 750 (1944); Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (1938), aff'd, 
281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482 (1939); cf. Seestedt v. Southern Laundry Co., 149 Fla. 402, 
5 So. 2d 859 (1942). But compare National Bank & Trust Co. v. American Nat'l Bank, 
217 Ind. 305, 311, 27 N.E.2d 764, 765-66 (1940). 
38 See 2 Loss, op. dt. supra note 3, ch. 6C; Cook & Feldman, Insider Trading Under 
the Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARV. L. REv. 385, 612 (1953); Rubin & Feldman, 
Statutory Inhibitions Upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information by Insiders, 95 U. 
PA. L. REv. 468 (1947); Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stock-
holders; Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1939); Com-
ment, 59 YALE L.J. 510 (1950). 
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an assumption which has not gone without challenge39-it by no 
means follows that an insider's "trading" or speculation in his 
corporation's securities is similarly desirable. The rewards sought 
from such activity are not necessarily related to any solid im-
provement in the prosperity of the corporation. Insider specula-
tion is not likely either to tie the insider into, nor to give him 
incentive to devote himself zealously to, the effective development 
of the enterprise's operating prosperity. Nor is it likely to give 
the public the confidence in the enterprise which might be de-
rived from bona fide insider investment. In short, while such 
practices offer a mode of compensation to corporate insiders meas-
ured by the dollars of profit they make,40 they offer little or noth-
ing of the advantages to public security holders claimed for bona 
fide insider investment.41 
On the other hand, Congress found, after extensive inquiry, 
that insider "trading" was often accompanied by certain evils-
use of inside knowledge to overreach buyers or sellers and use of 
inside power to injure the corporation or to create misleading 
impressions of value, to the detriment both of those who deal 
with insiders and of the other security holders who suffer by the 
effect of such misconduct or by action in reliance upon the false 
impressions thus created.42 To be sure, similar possibilities exist 
whenever an insider buys or sells securities. But both the op-
portunity and the temptation to indulge in them appear to be 
greater when the insider gets in and out (or vice versa) during a 
relatively short period of time than when he is required to hold 
his investment for a relatively long period and to run the risk of 
30 See BERLE &: MEANS, op. cit. supra note 36, at 225 n.6, 327, 329-30; Baker, Incentive 
Compensation Plans for Executives, 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 44 (1936). 
40 BERLE &: MEANS, op. cit. supra note 36, at 326-31; SEC 1Om ANN. REP. 50 (1945). 
Even this ground is lacking when the insider, instead of being an officer or director, is 
a controlling stockholder. 
41 Moreover as a mode of compensation, trading profits offer the corporation's se-
curity holders none of the protection against over-compensation which accompanies 
the more conventional modes of compensation, e.g., the requirement of disclosure of 
amounts involved, of board of director approval, and of fairness in the compensation 
such as some relation to the value of the services. Compare Berkwitz v. Humphrey, 163 
F. Supp. 78, 89-93 (N.D. Ohio 1958), with Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596 (Del. 
1959). 
42 See, e.g., legislative history of Securities Exchange Act cited supra note 27. See 
also Hearings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 
4344, 5065 and 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1941): SMITH, MANAGEMENT TRADING 
(1941). 
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contingencies he cannot so readily control. 43 The premises on 
which section l 6(b) rests are that whatever good may come from 
leaving insiders free to engage in short-swing transactions which 
are not shown to be wrongful in particular cases is more than 
offset by the frequency with which such trading is in fact likely 
to be wrongful, the inherent difficulties of proving any wrong-
doing, and the consequences to which such trading tends to lead. 
Integral to the resultant imposition of sanctions on all short-
swing transactions-even when insiders are not shown to have 
intended to "trade" or to have misled buyers or sellers, or to 
have misconducted corporate affairs for the purpose of facilitating 
their own trading-are two considerations. In the first place, 
there is, of course, the notion that it is difficult, if not impossible, 
to enforce any less extensive or more selective prohibition/4 par-
ticularly (although not exclusively) in the case of impersonal 
transactions on stock exchanges. In the second place, there is the 
belief that in order to protect the integrity of the securities mar-
kets and the free flow of public capital to large corporate enter-
prise, it is necessary to keep corporate insiders not only virtuous 
but above suspicion when dealing in their corporation's securi-
ties.45 Presumably, the decision to limit the sanction to the denial 
of profits in lieu of imposing penal or other consequences4.6 is 
attributable in part to the fact that the sanction is to be visited 
43 See note 38 supra. 
44 See testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, supra note 32. But cf. the treatment of a 
comparable problem of investment advisers in SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, Inc., 300 
F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961). 
45 See legislative history of § 16(b), note 27 supra. See also report of Special Com-
mittee on Securities Law Regulations of the American Bar Association, printed in Hear-
ings Before House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 4344, H.R. 
5065 and H.R. 5832, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 717 (1941): "A persistent cause of lack of 
public confidence in the exchanges has been the popular impression that they can be 
traded on profitably only by persons specially informed. Section 16(b) aids materially 
in the removal of reasons for that suspicion, and it also is in full accord with the 
principle that no person in a fiduciary relation should use information or opportunities 
coming to him because of his position for his own private profit. Until strong contrary 
proof shall be forthcoming, it is the committee's opinion that the public interest re-
quires that Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act should not be changed." See also id. 
at 1254-62, 1319, 1341, 1411-15. 
46 The original Fletcher-Rayburn bill made purchases with the intention to resell 
within six months unlawful, in addition to providing civil remedies. Hearings on S. 
Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and 97, supra note 27, at 6556-57. Compare Rev. Rul. 61-115, 1961 
INT. REv. BuLL. No. 25, at 7. Compare also In re Nazareth Fairgrounds&: Farmers' Mkt., 
Inc., 296 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted sub nom. Wolf v. Weinstein, 369 U.S. 837 
(1962). 
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on innocent as well as on tainted short-swing transactions by in-
siders. 47 
From time to time, questions have been raised as to whether 
the likelihood of such evils following from insider short-swing 
transactions and the difficulty of preventing or apprehending them 
are so great as to justify the broad sweep of the remedy thus pre-
scribed. And suggestions have been made that public investors 
derive significant advantages from insider trading of which the 
unselective thrust of section 16(b) deprives them, that the sanction 
is irrational, and that in any event the provision is an invitation 
to champerty.48 The SEG's answers to the principal of these ar-
guments49 has apparently satisfied Congress that the rule embodied 
in section 16(b) is preferable to any more selective deterrent. 
47 Compare Niles, Trustee Accountability in the Absence of Breach of Trust, 60 
CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 141 (1960). 
48 See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 3, at 1087-90. 
-i9 In its Report on Proposals for Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 made to the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce of the 77th Congress, 1st Session on August 7, 1941, the Commission 
commented as follows (pp. 36-38): 
"It has been asserted that the provision [§ 16(b)] operates to deter insiders from 
making purchases to retard a falling market. But if an insider really wishes to cushion 
a decline, section 16(b) does not make it unlawful for him to do so. It is only where 
the insider makes a profit within the relatively short period of 6 months that his profit 
is required to be turned over to the corporation. Furthermore, that particular argu-
ment for repeal of section 16(b) presupposes that insiders would act to bolster the 
market by trading primarily against the trend, buying in weak markets and selling in 
strong markets. But, even if it be assumed that some corporate officials would so act, 
the mere fact that the activities of some trustees might be advantageous to their bene-
ficiaries has never been considered an adequate reason for an abolition of the pro-
hibition against self-dealing by trustees in trust property. 
"Moreover, even if insiders would purchase in order to bolster the market, there is 
serious doubt whether investors would always be benefited. If the market continued 
to fall after the insiders had attempted to support the market, their activities would 
have injured those stockholders who had been induced not to sell and those new in-
vestors who had been induced to purchase by the false appearance of stability thus 
created ..•• The deterrent of section 16(b) to in-and-out trading by insiders is ••• con-
sistent with the time-honored doctrine that a trustee must avoid any activity which involves 
even a remote possibility of a conflict of interest between his fiduciary obligations and 
his personal self-interests. The Commission is convinced that any legislation which 
sought to distinguish between situations where inside information is actually used and 
those where it is not used would be self-defeating because of the inherent difficulties 
of establishing the use of inside information in particular cases. 
"It may also be urged with much force that even to the extent that section 16(b) 
may permit the recovery of profits made without the use of inside information it 
achieves a highly desirable objective. It is to be doubted whether the interests of se-
curity holders are benefited when the attention of their officers and directors is diverted 
from the corporation's affairs to stock market speculation in its securities. • • • 
" ••• Although the reporting of transactions may in some cases operate as a deterrent, 
it cannot be expected to prevent insiders from taking advantage of inside information. 
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C. Reorganizations 
Factors not unlike those which are thus reflected in the con-
gressional policy on insider "trading" operate on insider dealings 
in their corporation's securities during reorganizations in bank-
ruptcy and under the Holding Company Act. And similar judg-
ments are embodied in the rules fashioned to meet the problems 
raised by such dealings. Indeed, insider purchases pending a 
liquidation or during a reorganization have certain aspects which 
are similar to the "trading" at which section 16(b) is aimed.50 
The insider may, of course, be purchasing securities in the old 
enterprise with an eye to the long-term prosperity of the ultimately 
reorganized business, if it continues and there is no liquidation. 
But the imminence of the reorganization exchange suggests that 
when he purchases during or in contemplation of a reorganization 
he may also be interested in the shorter term increment attrib-
utable to fluctuations in security prices caused by transient reor-
ganization considerations. To allow him such an increment-
whether in the form of realized cash gain or of increased value 
in new securities-is to reward the insider with trading profits 
based on reorganization activities rather than with investment 
profits. On the other hand, a rule which denies an insider the 
profit on the reorganization exchange does not preclude him from 
enjoying the long-run improvement of the company, so that if he 
purchases for investment, he will not be denied the benefits of 
a wise choice or of his own efforts as a manager of the enterprise. 
,, To be sure, by denying the insider the exchange profit, his 
The temptations and the potential returns are too great to be effectively overcome 
merely by subsequent publicity. It was because the Congress did not believe that pub-
licity alone would be sufficient that it defined the standard in section 16(b)-that in-
siders, because of their fiduciary relationship, should not trade in-and-out in the se-
curities of their companies for their personal gain. The consequences of failing to 
comply with this standard are not penal. The section does not make insiders' trading 
unlawful; it does not even subject insiders to injunctive proceedings. It simply guards 
against the use of inside information since such information is not the personal prop-
erty of the insiders themselves and since any profits resulting from its use belong to 
the insiders no more than does the inside information itself." 
50 The reorganization exchange has been held to be a purchase or a sale within 
§ 16(b). Blau v. Hodgkinson, 100 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Blau v. Mission Corp., 
212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954); cf. Roberts v. Eaton, 212 
F.2d 82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 827 (1954) (recapitalization). Compare rules 
16b-6 & 16b-7 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 79 
(1958). See generally 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1066-75 (2d ed. 1961); Cook &: Feld-
man, supra note 38, at 626-28; Meeker & Cooney, The Problem of Definition in De• 
termining Insider Liabilities Under Section 16(b), 45 VA. L. REv. 949, 975-79 (1959). 
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enthusiasm in working for consummation of an advantageous re-
organization may be diluted. But such dilution of enthusiasm is 
apt to be marginal in the case of a controlling security holder who, 
by definition, starts with a substantial investment. And if, as is 
doubtful, it may be more significant in the case of an officer or 
director, the question of encouraging investment by such person-
nel during reorganization is clouded by the problems arising from 
making them owners of particular securities when the process of 
reorganization may mature substantial conflicts between the in-
terests of different classes of security holders. 51 
If the benefits to public investors from encouraging additional 
insider investment in the enterprise during a bankruptcy reor-
ganization crisis are not apt to be as great as the benefits expected 
during normal times when the insider's efforts are focused pri-
marily on improvement of operations,52 both the opportunity and 
the temptation to abuse inside power and knowledge are apt to 
be greater during such a crisis. Bankruptcy reorganization creates 
a more congenial atmosphere than usually obtains for substantial 
fluctuation in the prices of a corporation's securities. Whether 
the crisis will result in liquidation or reorganization, it will almost 
inevitably culminate in an exchange of outstanding securities,, 
either for underlying assets or for new participations. Attention is 
thus focused on what will be given for the outstanding securities; 
and the prices of those securities will respond not merely to the 
ultimate economic prospects of the enterprise and changes in, or 
rumors about, such prospects, but to proposed plans of reorganiza-
51 Whatever may be the problems for insiders in reconciling conflicting security-
holder interests during normal operations [see, e.g., Second Chenery decision, In re 
Federal Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 251 (1945); BERLE &: MEANS, op. dt. supra 
note 36, bk. II, chs. II &: III], during a reorganization, when security-holders' claims 
have effectively matured, to encourage management to purchase one rather than an-
other class of securities is plainly at odds with the purpose of encouraging management 
investment for the benefit of all classes of security holders. Compare Greene, Fiduciary 
Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 266, 284 (1959); SEC PROTECTIVE COMMITTEE SruDY, pt. VIII, at 440 (1937): "Even 
more dangerous to security holders [than trading on the basis of "inside" information] 
is the possibility of committee members becoming primarily interested because of 
trading activities in a security issue of the debtor other than that represented by their 
committee. The inevitable result is failure on their part in the first duty of persons in 
the fiduciary position of committeemen, which is to advance the interests of the per-
sons whom they represent." Sec also SEC PROT.ECIIVE Colllll!ITTEE STUDY, pt. II, at 517-18, 
pt. VII (1937); SEC, REPORT ON INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. III, 
ch. IV (1940). 
112 Cf. L. Hand, J., dissenting, In re Calton Crescent Hotel Co., 173 F.2d 944, 952 
(2d Cir. 1949), aff'd, 338 U.S. 304 (1950). 
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tion, to alterations in proposed exchange ratios, to delays in con-
summating proposed exchanges, and to reports and rumors of any 
such matters. 
By the same token, the shift in the emphasis of insiders' re-
sponsibilities from operational considerations to marshalling assets 
and negotiating changes in the participations of security holders 
whose claims have matured53 is accompanied by increased oppor-
tunities and temptations to abuse inside power and knowledge 
without detection. Those in a position, either as management or 
as controlling security-holders, to formulate or participate in for-
mulating reorganization plans, to propose amendments to them, 
to conduct negotiations on exchange ratios, to control the timing 
of such exchanges and the timing and content of reports on such 
activities, in addition to making the normal business judgments 
involved in the conduct of the corporate business (determining 
dividend policies, accounting techniques, maintenance policies, 
etc.), are in a position to make a concentrated impact on the prices 
at which the market will assess the worth of the corporation's se-
curities. Similarly, the advance information of proposed action 
or reports which an insider will acquire during such a period is 
likely to be of unusual value in any market transactions he may 
attempt for his personal benefi.t.54 
Finally, abuses of inside power or knowledge are no less diffi-
cult to detect during such corporate crises than normally. Rather, 
the problem of determining either whether the insider is buying 
or selling in reliance on special knowledge or whether he is guid-
ing reorganization or liquidation negotiations with an eye toward 
affecting prices of securities so that he can trade profitably, is apt 
to be more acute when the prices of securities may be affected 
substantially by so many subtle and intangible factors that are 
not present during normal operations.55 
It was in deference to these considerations that courts, and ul-
timately Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
fashioned rules to discourage insiders from purchasing claims at a 
discount or otherwise dealing in securities-however innocently-
when their corporations were in, or on the verge of, insolvency 
53 See note 57 infra. 
CH See SEC PROTECTIVE COMMITIEE STUDY, pt. I, at 155-56, pt. II, at 315-41 (1937). 
55 Second Chenery decision, In re Federal Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 256•57 
(1945). See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 151, 156 (1950). 
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liquidation or insolvency or Holding Company Act reorganization. 
The dominant notion is that during such corporate crises public 
investors can be protected adequately only if insiders are discour-
aged from any and all dealings in securities rather than merely 
penalized for transactions of demonstrated impropriety. 
III. EXTENSION OF THE RULE TO COMP ARABLE CONTEXTS 
To recognize that insider transactions (other than trading) in 
securities of publicly-held corporations are, and should be, cen-
surable normally only on a selective basis is not to deny that the 
considerations which impelled courts, Congress and the SEC to 
adopt a policy of broader accountability for profits from such deal-
ings in certain specified circumstances may require a similar policy 
in cognate circumstances.116 Thus, in all relevant respects similar to 
forced reorganizations under chapter X or the Holding Company 
Act are voluntary mergers and consolidations, sales of substantially 
all the assets of a corporation and reinvestment of the proceeds, 
and substantial recapitalizations or liquidation. The radical alter-
ations thus occurring in the enterprise effect in substance, and 
generally in form, a change in the nature of the security-holder's 
participation. As a result of a recapitalization he will receive a 
new kind of participation; in the case of a merger or consolida-
tion he will receive a new security in a new enterprise. When 
assets have been sold and new businesses are sought for investment 
of the resulting pool of capital, while the investor will not receive 
a new security, he will become an investor in a totally different 
business. In a liquidation he will receive his share of the under-
116 E.g., the reasons for seeking to discourage-by requiring accountability for profits 
derived from-insider "trading" in stock of corporations listed on stock exchanges seem 
no less applicable to insider "trading" in any securities of publicly-held corporations on 
other organized markets, such as the over-the-counter markets, whose scope and volume 
of transactions have increased considerably since 1934. Those reasons and countervailing 
considerations are discussed in the congressional Hearings and Committee Reports cited 
in Loss, op. cit. supra note 9. It may also be noted that securities of considerably more 
speculative character than those traded on exchanges tend to be traded in the over• 
the-counter markets; and those markets are often the initial medium for trading in the 
securities of corporations which have not previously issued securities to the public and 
whose managements ot controlling stockholders are not entirely alert to their respon-
sibilities to public security holders. Compare Address by SEC Chairman, San Francisco, 
March 28, 1962, quoted in SEC Digest, March 28, 1962. To the extent that the full 
panoply of reporting and regulatory requirements governing the activities of insiders 
of corporations whose securities are traded on exchanges has not been extended to the 
over-the-counter markets, there is even more reason for discouraging insider trading on 
those markets. 
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lying assets or the proceeds of the sale of all or part of them. Be-
cause of the magnitude of the alterations thus being made in the 
structure or character of the enterprise and in security holders' 
rights, both immediately prior to and during the period of such 
crises, there is apt to be an increased volatility in the prices of 
the enterprise's securities, which will respond to considerations 
stemming from the potential readjustment rather than merely 
from normal operating developments. 
At the same time, the function and responsibility of insiders 
vis-a-vis other security holders changes.57 Thus, for example, the 
use of a corporation's cash to purchase its debt at a price below 
face value or its stock at a price below asset value while it is a 
going concern raises different problems and reflects different con-
siderations than would similar purchases when the corporation is 
being liquidated or its business is being converted. Hence, the 
propriety of an insider's purchases of such debt or stock is to be 
assessed differently in the light of the corporation's different re-
quirements and of the possibilities of conflict with the imminently 
maturing claims of his fellow security holders, whether of the 
same or of a different class.58 
By the same token, the insider's opportunity to affect securi-
ties prices artificially, sometimes at the risk of injury to the cor-
poration and fellow security holders, increases substantially. In 
addition to his power to affect the dividend rate or even the flow 
of earnings during the pendency of the readjustment crisis, there 
are the possibilities of altering the terms of the merger exchange 
during the bargaining process, of delaying consummation of the 
merger, or even of discontinuing the negotiations. Similarly, within 
fairly broad areas, insiders can delay or accelerate the purchase of 
57 It may also be noted that officers, directors or controlling stockholders often fill, 
during a voluntary reorganization crisis, the additional roles of the fiduciaries covered 
by §§ 249 and 212 of ch. X. Cf. In re Nazareth Fairgrounds 8c Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 
F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted, sub nom. Wolf v. Weinstein, 369 U.S. 837 (1962). 
Although it is far from universally recognized, the insider's altered position during a cor-
porate crisis has been noted with respect both to those with whom he deals [e.g., Westwood 
v. Continental Can Co., 80 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1935); Dunnett v. Am, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 
1935); Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N.W. 414 (1925); Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 
107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932); Allen v. Hyatt, 30 T.L.R. 444 (P.C. 1914)] and with respect to 
his corporation and its other security holders. Compare note 15 supra. See also Bond 8c 
Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E. 721 (1952); Middle W. Corp., 27 S.E.C. 195, 
224 (1947); Cities Serv. Co., 26 S.E.C. 678, 690-91 (1947). 
58 See In re Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., 221 F.2d 708, 713 (3d Cir. 1955). See also note 
51 supra. 
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a new business with the liquid assets obtained from the sale of the 
old business, and have significant advance knowledge of the kind 
of new business for which purchase negotiations are commencing 
or the likelihood and terms of sales of assets or settlements of 
controversies during a prolonged liquidation. Judicious timing of 
financial reports and statements of progress or lack of progress in 
such matters effectively adds to the insider's power and potential 
ability to utilize advance knowledge of, or to affect, a relatively 
volatile market. 
The significance of such factors is accentuated by the diffi-
culty of detecting culpable misconduct or enforcing a rule of full 
disclosure by insiders buying or selling corporate securities or 
trading in them at such times. If during or in contemplation of 
merger negotiations an insider purchases securities, it may, and 
often will, be virtually impossible to determine whether his con-
duct of the merger negotiations is, for example, merely a cautious 
response to legitimate bargaining considerations or is designed 
to affect prices momentarily to the detriment of the sellers and 
possibly of other security holders, or whether he is taking advan-
tage of inside knowledge, or whether he is depriving the corpora-
tion and its remaining security holders of a legitimate bargain 
purchase or is failing to exercise his best efforts to obtain such a 
bargain for them. Additional problems arise if the corporation 
has several classes of securities and the officer or director buys or 
sells securities of one, but not of another, class. Similarly, if he 
sells during the merger negotiations, difficult questions are pre-
sented in determining whether he is relying on inside information 
unknown to the buyer, or conducting negotiations so as artificially 
to raise prices in order to facilitate his sale at the expense of the 
buyer and of other security holders.59 Transactions by insiders 
119 The complete termination of an insider's investment interest in his corporation 
presents a somewhat different problem than does the sale of merely a portion of his 
interest. Whether the insider holds a controlling interest or is simply a member of 
management, with a relatively small investment, who is resigning, his freedom to "get 
out" ought arguably to be less restricted than his freedom to dispose of a portion of 
his investment while continuing to remain an insider. The argument is that the public 
may have an interest in facilitating the departure of one controlling group or manage-
ment and the acquisition of control by a new group. See Hill, The Sale of Controlling 
Shares, 70 HARV. L, R.Ev. 986 (1957); Katz, The Sale of Corporate Control, 38 CHICAco 
B. RECORD 376 (1957). To the extent that insiders wish to terminate their relationship 
with the corporation, denying them any increment in the price of their securities which 
might be attributable to the corporate crisis or to their sale of control, will tend to 
have a discouraging effect on such departure. But whatever point this argument may 
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when a recapitalization is planned give rise to many of the same 
questions. 
Comparable problems also arise when the corporation is in 
liquidation or has sold its assets and is seeking a new investment. 
If there is a delay in the liquidation or in reinvesting the proceeds, 
the prices of its securities will normally fall. For an insider to 
purchase during such a period raises questions as to whether he is 
relying on inside information so that in effect he misleads the 
seller, or whether he is competing unfairly with the corporation 
and its remaining security holders,60 or failing to exercise his best 
efforts to acquire a new business or speed the liquidation, or is 
otherwise injuring those appropriately regarded as his benefici-
aries. Such questions pose inquiries which cannot practicably pro-
duce answers. Thus, for example, when a corporation has 
only liquid assets which it is seeking to reinvest in a new 
business or businesses, it will be the unusual case in which evi-
dence will be available to establish with reasonable clarity whether 
the failure to find such a business promptly is a function of the in-
siders' exercise of due caution · or is affected by their desire to 
facilitate advantageous purchases of corporate securities for them-
selves. Similarly in the case of an enterprise in liquidation, proof 
will be difficult, if not impossible, for those seeking to ascertain 
whether delay in the sale of assets or the wind-up of tax contro-
versies or the like is attributable to appropriate care in the liquida-
tion process or to self-interest in acquiring the corporation's se-
curities cheaply.61 
The public interest in the integrity of the securities markets 
and of insiders' conduct of corporate affairs which impels restric-
tions on insiders securities dealings, however innocent, during in-
solvency and Holding Company Act reorganization is present dur-
have in the case of those who seek to sell control, it is of doubtful merit when only a 
portion of the insider's investment is being sold, or otherwise dischargeable members 
of management are selling their holdings. On sale of control, see generally Berle, "Con-
trol" in Corporate Law, 58 C0Lu11i:. L. REv. 1212, 1220-22 (1958); Jennings, Trading 
in Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. I (1956); Leech, Transactions in Co1-porate Con-
trol, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725 (1956). Compare cases dealing with the corporation's 
litigable "interest" or lack thereof in dealings in its stock during a struggle for control 
among its stockholders. See Note, 62 Cowl\!. L. REv. 1096 (1962). 
60 I.e., shouldn't the available cash be used to purchase corporate securities which 
are selling at a discount? 
61 Compare Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 431-32, 103 N.E.2d 721, 726 
(1952), with Victor v. Hillebrecht, 405 Ill. 264, 90 N.E.2d 751, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 980 
(1950). 
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ing voluntary corporate readjustment crises, with little, if any, 
difference in degree.62 Indeed, other factors suggest a somewhat 
stronger basis for prophylactic discouragement of insider dealings 
or trading during such voluntarily created corporate crises. To 
the extent that regulatory approval is not required, the protection 
which might flow from supervision or examination of the sale of 
assets and change of business or of the merger or liquidation proc-
ess by an administrative agency is absent. And to the extent that 
insider purchasing and selling is not required to be reported (e.g., 
if the corporation's securities are not listed on a securities exchange) 
and no public security holder representation exists, the protection 
flowing from participation by organized security holder groups, 
which is typically found in bankruptcy or Holding Company Act 
reorganization, is also lacking. 63 The resultant ability of the insider 
to function free from the inquiring eye of either a regulatory 
agency or outside security holders may be as desirable as it appears 
necessary. But it unquestionably accentuates the problems created 
by his purchases and sales during such times.64 
IV. THE CASE LAW AND OBJECTIONS TO EXTENSION OF THE RULE 
From the point of view of persons dealing with insiders, the 
solution so far evolved for such problems is the requirement of 
full disclosure by the latter, although even that prescription is 
62 On the other hand, the case law, at least in non-crisis situations, relieves insiders 
who issue misleading statements or fail to disclose material facts from liability in 
damages to security holders who do not deal with them [see Donovan v. Taylor, 136 
F. Supp. 552 (N.D. Cal. 1955); Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio &: Television Corp., 99 
F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952); Comment, 42 VA. L. 
REv. 537, 570-72 (1956); Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 308 (1952). Compare Fischman Ray-
theon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), and 3 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1767-97 
(2d ed. 1961)] and from accountability to their corporations for profits from securities 
transactions made on the basis of such statements or omissions. [Newman v. Bald• 
win, 13 Misc. 2d 898, 179 N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Leffert v. Marcus, 12 Misc. 2d 
1097, 174 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Sup. Ct. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 7 App. Div. 2d 989, 
183 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1959); but cf. Stella v. Kaiser, 82 F. Supp. 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)]. 
However, comparison of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 596 (1952), with Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955), suggests that while security holders who simply retain 
their holdings during a corporate crisis may not be entitled to protection against in-
siders on the theory of fraud, they may be entitled to an accounting on the theory of 
breach of trust or divided loyalty. 
63 Compare SEC PROTECTIVE COMMlTIEE STUDY, pt. VII (1938); SEC, REPORT ON 
INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES, pt. Ill, ch. IV, at 1414-15 (1940). 
64 Cf. Second Chenery decision, In re Federal Water Serv. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 231, 
251-52 (1945). 
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not uniformly accepted as a permissible limitation on insiders' 
freedom to buy or sell their corporation's securities. But the 
relative frequency of litigation based on failure to disclose the 
imminence of voluntary mergers, sales of control, or the like, un-
derscores the temptation to overreach "outsiders" in such circum-
stances.e5 And the unusual difficulty of defining, let alone enforcing, 
adequate disclosure at such times suggests that a requirement of 
disclosure will not be a feasible or effective answer to the problem 
of controlling that temptation.66 Moreover, to the extent that 
outside buyers and sellers are protected only if they are in privity 
with insiders who purchase or sell, the insider is not liable for 
failure to disclose material facts to those who may be induced, 
by his misleading statements or omissions or actions, to buy or 
sell securities but who do not deal with the insider in doing so. 
In short, however rational a requirement of disclosure may be to 
protect buyers or sellers, it is doubtful that it is any more ade-
quate during voluntary reorganization or business change-over 
crises in the affairs of publicly-held corporations than it was found 
to be during bankruptcy reorganization.67 
65 The "special circumstances" doctrine, through which the full disclosure rule often 
makes its appearance, was developed judicially in order to compel insider disclosure of 
precisely such special circumstances as an impending merger, sale of assets or liquida-
tion. See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 213 (2d ed. 1946); BERLE 8: MEANS, op. cit. supra 
note 36, at 324; 3 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS 786-90 (1947); STEVENS, COR-
PORATIONS 690-705 (2d ed. 1949). 
66 Not only is there the problem of how to make, or what constitutes, adequate dis-
closure about shifting and uncertain negotiations for a sale of assets or purchase of a 
business or terms of a merger, but the very fact of disclosure may itself affect the 
negotiation process significantly-and adversely. Compare note 36 supra. See Daum 8: 
Phillips, The Implications of Cady Roberts, 17 Bus. I.Aw. 939, 953 (1962). Hence, a rule 
discouraging insiders from all dealing in such circumstances, by denying them their 
profits, may well be the only adequate remedy to protect "outside" sellers or buyers. 
To be sure, the effect of such a rule will be to restrict the opportunities for an outside 
security holder to deal with insiders more narrowly than comparable opportunities for 
a fully informed and competent beneficiary of a trust to deal with the trustee. 
The existence of such a rule need not permit an outside security holder to recover from 
the insider with whom he has dealt in an action on his own behalf unless he proves 
actual misbehavior or overreaching. Compare, e.g., Dunnett v. Arn, 71 F.2d 912 (10th 
Cir. 1935), with Roby v. Dunnett, 88 F.2d 68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937). 
See also Conant, Duties of Disclosure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 
CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960). 
67 If disclosure of the relevant facts is an inadequate or infeasible remedy to protect 
"outside" buyers or sellers in such contexts, the suggestion that the insider should re-
frain from dealing in his corporation's securities during the readjustment crisis in order 
effectively to protect them is not without parallel. As the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has pointed out, if a broker (whose fiduciary obligations to those with 
whom he deals have never been deemed as rigorous as an "insider's comparable obliga-
tions') is unable to effect appropriate disclosures of inside information in dealing on 
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From the point of view of the corporation and its remaining se-
curity holders, the scope of insiders' obligations during such re-
adjustment crises has not been adequately defined either by case 
law or by statute. Since the insider can substantially influence, and 
often completely determine, corporate action during such a crisis, 
the question is whether he should be permitted to enjoy personal 
profits from security dealings-profits which may well be unavail-
able for outsiders68-if to acquire such profits he may have to make 
decisions in his corporate capacity which are indifferent to or in 
conflict with, the interests of the corporation and his fellow se-
curity holders. 
If treated narrowly, as a question of corporate opportunity, 
the problem may be analogized to the situation in which the cor-
poration is apparently unable to exploit a potential opportunity 
because of lack of funds, because of some legal obstacle, or because 
the person offering the opportunity is purportedly unwilling to 
deal with it, and the insider takes advantage of the corporate op-
portunity for his own benefit. Despite frequent pious platitudes 
to the contrary, neither legislatures nor courts have seen fit to 
deprive the insider in all, or indeed in most, such circumstances 
of the temptation to choose between his interest and the interest 
of the recognized beneficiaries by prescribing a universal rule 
denying him the fruits of such extraneous activities when they 
have not demonstrably harmed the corporation or its other se-
curity holders!39 However, from time to time a court will require 
an exchange, "all ... [he] need do is keep out of the market until the established 
procedures for public release of the information are carried out .... " Cady, Roberts 
&: Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ,i 76803, at 81019 (1961). 
68 E.g., to the extent that the insider is in a position to realize the discount be-
tween the asset value and the market price of his corporation's stock by compelling 
liquidation of the enterprise, he has an intrinsic advantage over outside security 
holders (with respect to the purchase of securities) by reason of his "control" position. 
A court of equity could well preclude him from exploiting his advantage during a 
corporate crisis. Compare Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
!149 U.S. 952 (1955) and similar sale-of-control cases discussed in authorities collected 
note 59 supra; see also cases cited note 70 infra. 
oo See Carrington & McElroy, The Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity, 14 Bus. LAw. 
957 (1959); Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by Directorship Status on Personal Business 
Activities of Directo1-s, 26 WASH. L. REv. 189 (1941); Ramsey, Directors Power To Com-
pete with His Corporation, 18 IND. L.J. 293 (1943); Walker, Legal Handles Used To 
Open or Close the Corporate Opportunity Door, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 608 (1961); Com-
ment, 31 CALIF. L. REv. 188 (1943); Note, 39 COLUM. L. REv. 219 (1939); Note, Corporate 
opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REV. 765 (1961); Note, 54 HARV. L. REV. ll91 (1941); Note, 
Statutory Sanctions for Conduct of Corporate Directors, 26 IowA L. REv. 334 (1941); 
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an insider to account for his profits even in the absence of a show-
ing of harm, 70 on the theory that although the corporation might 
be unable itself to exploit a particular opportunity, the insider 
should be denied the right to exploit it and the concomitant temp-
tation to inhibit the corporation frorp. making every effort to 
do so.71 
Thus in the classic case of Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch,72 
which involved an effort to compel directors to account for profits 
from their acquisition and subsequent sale of stock of a company 
which their own corporation had contracted to purchase and re-
quired for its successful operation, the directors were not relieved 
of accountability by their claim that their corporation had been 
financially unable to purchase the stock. The court rejected this 
defense on the ground that "if directors are permitted to justify 
their conduct on such a theory, there will be a temptation to re-
frain from exerting their strongest efforts on behalf of the corpora-
tion since . . . an opportunity of profit will be open to them per-
sonally. "73 Similarly in L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp. v. Falls,7'l 
a corporation's executives who acquired for themselves royalties 
Note, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 1008 (1936); Note, 2 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 323 (1935); Note, 44 
YALE L.J. 527 (1935). 
70 See, e.g., Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 
294 U.S. 708 (1935) (alleged financial inability of corporation); Blum v. Fleishhacker, 
21 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Cal. 1937), aff'd on this point, 109 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1940); News-
Journal Corp. v. Gore, 147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941); Farwell v. Pyle Nat'l Elec. 
Headlight Co., 289 Ill. 157, 124 N.E. 449 (1919); L. A. Young Spring &: Wire Corp. v. 
Falls, 307 Mich. 69, 102, 11 N.W.2d 329, 341 (1943) (alleged refusal of third persons to 
deal with corporation); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 (1931); 
Regal v. Gulliver, (1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.) (alleged illegality of corporate acquisi-
tion); and compare Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586 (1920) (receiver). See HORNSTEIN, 
CORPORATION LAw &: PRAcrICE §§ 441, 442 (1960); Note, 104 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 242 (1955). 
71 It may be noted here that, in contrast to the benefits which might flow to public 
investors from direct dealings between insiders and their corporations or between cor-
porations having common directors (see, e.g., BERLE &: MEANS, op. cit. supra note 36, at 
230-31), it is difficult to envisage any benefit to the corporation from competitive activ-
ities by insiders, and it is generally much more difficult in such "corporate oppor-
tunity" cases to determine whether the insider in thus seeking his own personal gain 
has injured the corporation (e.g., by depriving it of a valuable opportunity or by failing 
to exercise his best efforts on its behalf) than in direct dealing cases where the insider 
gives a quid pro quo whose value can be assessed. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Wolfson, 153 
F. Supp. 253, 255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Hence, in the latter type of case in contrast to 
the former, there is available a relatively feasible test of fairness to determine the 
propriety of any particular instance of self-dealing, and there is independent reason 
not to press for a rule discouraging all self-dealing. 
72 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934). 
73 Id. at 124. 
74 307 Mich. 69, 11 N.W.2d 329 (1943). 
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under a patent which they should have acquired for their corpora-
tion, were not relieved of the duty to account to their corporation 
by the claim that the owner of the patent would not have dealt 
with the corporation. The court held such argument to be with-
out merit "as it would open the door for any trusted executive 
to justify his breach of duty in acquiring interests adverse to those 
of his employer by merely claiming that his employer could not 
obtain such interests." In the circumstances, "it was at least their 
duty not to acquire interests ... in the inventions for their per-
sonal profit.''711 
Insiders' dealings in their corporation's debts or securities 
present no less acute, and indeed considerably less tolerable, possi-
bilities of conflict and temptation. Thus a principal consideration 
underlying the frequent extension of relatively wide latitude to 
insiders in competing with their corporations for business oppor-
tunities is the desirability of having as corporate directors men of 
large and varied business interests and affairs. The usual argument 
is that if insiders are unduly hampered by law in engaging in col-
lateral business enterprises they will be deterred from becoming 
directors or officers. However valid such considerations may be, 
they do not obtain where the question turns on restricting only 
the insider's freedom to deal in his corporation's securities during 
corporate readjustment crises, rather than his freedom to acquire 
other business interests or investments generally. The significance 
of such narrowing factors has been recognized implicitly, if not 
explicitly, by both Congress and the courts in restricting insiders' 
securities transactions.76 
If the scope of the insider's obligation is treated more broadly 
as a problem of divided loyalty in managing corporate affairs 
generally, analogous cases suggest, from time to time, that he 
should be held accountable for his profits from securities trans-
111 Id. at 102, 11 N.W.2d at MI. 
76 E.g., Congress, while imposing a categorical rule of accountability for profits from 
short-swing transactions by insiders of closed-end registered investment companies in 
securities of their companies [Investment Company Act of 1940, § ll0(f), 54 Stat. 8ll7, 
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2g(f) (1958)] did not impose so rigorous a rule to govern their dealings 
in portfolio securities held by their corporations. See Hearings Before a Subcommittee 
of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on S. 3580, 76th Cong., lid Sess. 
ll02-04-, 4lll-14 (1940). See Brown v. Bullock, 194- F. Supp. 207, 239 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 
294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Bureau, Inc., llOO F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 
1961). See proposed rule R. 204-2(a)(l2) under the Investment Advisers Act, Investment 
Advisers .Act Rel. No. 120, Oct. 16, 1961. 
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actions which subject him to the temptation to mismanage or be-
tray the corporation, even though he is not shown to have injured 
it.77 Thus in Ashman v. Miller,78 insiders who made several ad-
vantageous purchases of their publishing corporation's voting 
trust certificates from other holders, although not required to ac-
count for all such purchases, were required to turn over to the 
corporation, at cost plus interest, those certificates that they had 
purchased with funds borrowed from an enterprise supplying their 
corporation with newsprint, because they had thus placed them-
selves in a position where the supplier might be able to coerce 
them to continue the purchase of newsprint from it regardless of 
competitive prices in disregard of their duty to their corporation. 
Under such circumstances, the court felt that it would be both in-
equitable and against sound public policy to permit the directors 
to profit by the transaction. Indeed, on occasion, albeit not without 
substantial contrary authority, it has been suggested that suffi-
ciently divided loyalty results from buying or selling securities 
during corporate crises other than bankruptcy to require insider 
accountability for profits even though he is not at fault and has 
caused no demonstrable injury.79 
The respectable body of case law which has declined, or at least 
failed, to require such sweeping accountability involves, for the 
most part, closed corporations.80 With respect to such enterprises it 
77 Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 91 (6th Cir. 1939); Thompson v. Mitchell, 128 
Wash. 192, 222 Pac. 617 (1924). See also Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 231, 70 
A.2d 5 (1948), and compare Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble &: White Lime Co., 334 
Mo. 319, 324-26, 66 S.W.2d 889, 892-93 (1933); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 194, 189 
Atl. 320, 324 (1937); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 
296 Pac. 231 (1931); Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 546-55 
(1949). 
78 Note 77 supra. 
79 Bond &: Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E. 721 (1952). See also American 
Trust Co. v. California W. States Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 2d 42, 61-64, 98 P.2d 497, 507-08 
(1940); Harbor Plywood Corp., Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. 3427, Feb. 16, 1962; but cf. 
Gallagher v. Pacific-American Co., 97 F.2d 193 (8th Cir. 1938). Compare Perlman v. 
Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Commonwealth 
Title Ins. &: Trust Co. v. Seltzer, 227 Pa. 410, 76 Atl. 77 (1910). 
so E.g., Beedle v. Campbell, 100 F.2d 798 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 631 (1939); 
Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 28-29 (8th Cir. 1927); Hart v. Brown, 
77 III. 226 (1875); Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946); Beaumont v. Fol-
som, lll6 Neb. 235, 285 N.W. 547 (1939); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 
461, 469-70, 179 P.2d 147, 157 (1947): McGeoch Bldg. Co. v. Dick &: Rueteman Co., 253 
Wis. 167, 172-73, 33 N.W.2d 252, 255, rehearing denied, 253 Wis. 177, 33 N.W.2d 864 
(1948); but cf. Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land &: Lumber Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 
1179-80, 83 S.W. 599, 602 (Ct. App. 1904); McManus v. Durant, 168 App. Div. 643, 657, 
154 N.Y. Supp. 580, 590 (App. Div. 1915). 
1962] INSIDER SECURITIES DEALINGS 29 
is generally appropriate and feasible to enforce insiders' fiduciary 
obligations by narrower strictures. Insiders in closely-held ventures 
are able to communicate more effectively with their investors, and 
the latter are more likely than investors in publicly-held enter-
prises to be able to exercise meaningful scrutiny, if not supervi-
sion, over the former. Hence, the high standards of conduct pre-
scribed for insiders in cases such as Hotchkiss v. Fischer,81 and 
]acquith v. Mason,82 with respect to dealings with outside buyers 
and sellers, may be satisfied by requiring the insider to make full 
disclosure; and the insider's fiduciary obligations to the closed cor-
poration and its other security holders derived from the principles 
underlying cases like Meinhard v. Salmond83 may be met by re-
quiring him to obtain the other security holders' informed consent 
to his transaction or to offer to them an opportunity to partici-
pate in it on the same terms as he does. But such remedies are 
neither entirely adequate nor as readily available to implement 
insiders' fiduciary duties in the case of publicly-held corporations 
in readjustment crises.84 
The cases declining to require insider accountability for deal-
ing in securities of publicly-held corporations85 tend to rely on 
premises which are both inapposite to the problems involved and 
inconsistent with the principles prescribing insider obligations in 
insolvency liquidation or reorganization and in related contexts. 
Thus, one general premise on which the cases often purport to rest 
is that neither the corporation nor its other security holders has 
81 lll6 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932). 
82 99 Neb. 509, 156 N.W. 1041 (1916). 
83 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
84 See notes 66 and 68 supra. It may be noted, moreover, that even the selective 
prescriptions in the case of closed corporations are often enforced either by compelling 
performance of the duty to inform or invite participation or by requiring accountability 
for profits when the prescription is not followed. Wabunga Land Co. v. Schwanbeck, 
245 Mich. 505, 222 N.W. 707 (1929); Kelly v. 74 &: 76 W. Tremont Ave. Corp., 4 Misc. 
2d 533, 151 N.Y.S.2d 900 (Sup. Ct. 1956), modified and afj'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 821, 
160 N.Y.S.2d 932, afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 973 (1957); Glen Allen Mining Co. v. Park 
Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 388, 296 Pac. 231, 241 (1931). See also Dutton v. 
Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N.W. 414 (1925); and compare Coleman v. Hanger, 210 Ky. 
309, 275 S.W. 784 (1925); Young v. Columbia Oil Co., 110 W. Va. 364, 158 S.E. 678 
(1931); and Regal v. Gulliver, [1942] I All E.R. 378 (H.L.). Compare Note, Corporate 
Opportunity, 74 HARv. L. REv. 765, 772-75 (1961); but cf. Stevens v. Hale-Haas Corp., 
249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 (1946). 
811 Donnelly v. Consolidated Inv. Co., 99 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1938); Victor v. Hille• 
brecht, 405 Ill. 264, 90 N.E.2d 751, cert. denied, 339 U.S. 980 (1950). Compare Keely v. 
Black, 91 N.J. Eq. 520, 111 Atl. 22 (1920); Stanton v. Schenck, 142 Misc. 406, 252 N.Y. 
Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931); 140 Misc. 621, 251 N.Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. 1931). 
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any vindicable interest in the insider's stock or securities dealings 
with his purchasers or sellers.86 This generality ignores the substan-
tial body of cases involving the purchase or sale of securities in 
possible competition with the corporation87 as well as the cases 
dealing with the misconduct of corporate affairs in order to facili-
tate such purchases or sales.88 Even when the corporation is not in-
volved in a reorganization crisis or in liquidation, the courts have 
repeatedly held insiders accountable to the corporation or its secu-
rity holders solely because, in connection with their efforts to pur-
chase or sell their corporation's securities, they have violated fiduci-
ary obligations they were deemed to have to the corp(?ration,80 or to 
its remaining security holders.90 Hence the question is not whether, 
86 See cases cited note 85 supra. See also Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 
F.2d 24, 27 (8th Cir. 1927); Dupont v. Dupont, 256 Fed. 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 
U.S. 642 (1919); Hauben v. Morris, 255 App. Div. 35, 5 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1938), 
aff'd, 281 N.Y. 652, 22 N.E.2d 482 (1939); Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 
461, 179 P.2d 147 (1947); Stevens v. Hale-Haas Corp., 249 Wis. 205, 23 N.W.2d 620 
(1946). Occasionally the cases suggest a different rule for insider trading in stock during 
an insolvency crisis than they do for insider purchases of debt claims. E.g., Donnelly v. 
Consolidated Inv. Trust, 99 F.2d 185, 187 (1st Cir. 1935); In re Los Angeles Lumber 
Prod., 46 F. Supp. 77, 90 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Victor v. Hillebrecht, supra note 85; Brown v. 
Cooper, 62 Tenn. 153 (1873); American Bank &: Trust Co. v. Lebanon Bank &: Trust Co., 
28 Tenn. App. 618, 192 S.W.2d 245 (1945); cf. In re Midland United Co., 159 F.2d 
340, 345 (3d Cir. 1947). On the assumption that the only evil to be reached is 
competing with the corporation in securing the discharge of its obligations at a 
discount [cf. Manacher v. Central Coal Co., 63 N.Y.S.2d 463, 465 (Sup. Ct. 1946)] 
insiders have been held free to buy stock during a corporate crisis, since stock, like 
a cestui's interest in a trust, does not represent a claim against the corporation which 
the trustee is obliged to settle on the best terms. To the extent that the basic assump• 
tion is too narrow because the rule of accountability is aimed at more than the mere 
deprivation of a corporate opportunity, the reasoning of such cases must fall. Moreover, 
in liquidation and reorganization situations it is not entirely accurate to make the 
distinction between debt and stock thus suggested. ·when security holder participations 
are being rearranged or paid off, all security holders are claimants and the corporation's 
purchase of some of those claims at a discount might provide extra values for distribution 
to the remaining claimants of the same or junior classes. 
87 See cases cited note 15 supra; compare also the qualifying language in, e.g., 
Bisbee v. Midland Linseed Prod. Co., 19 F.2d 24, 27 (8th Cir. 1927); Dupont v. Dupont, 
supra note 86, at 132-33; Hauben v. Morris, supra note 86, 5 N.Y.S.2d, at 730. See also 
Merger Mines Corp. v. Grismer, 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943). 
88 See cases cited note 34 supra; cf. Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12 (10th Cir.), cert. 
granted, 352 U.S. 888 (1956), remanded for dismissal by agreement, 355 U.S. 600 (1958); 
Seagrave Corp. v. Mount, 212 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1954); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 
F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941); STEVENS, 
CORPORATIONS 793-97 (2d ed. 1949). 
89 See notes 87 and 88 supra. 
90 See note 88 supra. With respect to the security holders with whom they deal, 
the existence and character of the insider's fiduciary obligations depend on which of the 
competing rules applies in a particular jurisdiction. See notes 3 and 33 supra. Compare 
Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S.E. 232 (1903), with King Mfg. Co. v. Clay, 216 Ga. 
481, 118 S.E.2d 581 (1961). 
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in the abstract, an insider owes either the corporation or its security 
holders any obligations in connection with his purchases or sales 
of the corporation's securities. Rather, it is whether the nature of 
his obligations and of the temptations to abuse them during a 
corporate crisis justifies a rule designed not merely to vindicate 
any violation of his obligations but to remove from the insider the 
temptation to violate them. 
It has been argued against extension of such a rule of account-
ability to insider dealings other than during the pendency of in-
solvency reorganization that the corporation and its security hold-
ers should not be deprived of the benefits they might derive from 
insider purchases.91 Thus in Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker,92 
which declined to extend the rule against insider enforcement at 
face value of bonds purchased at a discount during bankruptcy to 
purchases made prior to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings, 
the Supreme Court predicated its decision in part on the proposi-
tion that the insiders' pre-bankruptcy acquisition of claims against 
their enterprise at less than seven cents on the dollar may have con-
stituted "reinforcement of the insolvent's position" and "a factor 
in preventing further financial deterioration of debtor."93 Similar 
to that suggestion is the notion that insider purchases during cor-
porate crises may be necessary to enable the insiders to retain con-
trol or to eliminate elements hostile or cool to the proposed 
reorganization or merger or liquidation, or to prevent forced bank-
91 The argument quite obviously does not apply to insider sales or trading. See 
text at notes 35 and 39-41 supra. 
112 338 U.S. 304 (1950). The Becker case arose under chapter XI, and therefore was 
not literally within § 212, of the Bankruptcy Act which authorizes courts to hold to 
cost securities acquired "in contemplation" of a reorganization. Several lower court 
cases deny enforcement in full of claims purchased at a discount before insolvency 
proceedings were initiated or when they were not pending. E.g., In re Van Sweringen 
Corp., 119 F.2d 231, 234 (6th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 671 (1942), time of 
insider's purchases set out in Gouchenour v. Cleveland Terminals Bldg. Co., 142 F.2d 
991, 992 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944); In re Franklin Bldg. Co., 83 F. 
Supp. 263 (D. Wis. 1948), afj'd, 178 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 978 
(1950); In re Jersey Materials Co., 50 F. Supp. 428 (D.N.J. 1943); In re Los Angeles 
Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77 (S.D. Cal. 1941); Bramblet v. Commonwealth Land &: 
Lumber Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 83 S.W. 599 (Ct. App. 1904); but cf. In re Philadelphia 
&: W. Ry., 64 F. Supp. 738, 740-41 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 
03 338 U.S. at 313; cf. In re Nazareth Fairgrounds &: Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 F.2d 678 
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted sub nom. Wolf v. Weinstein, 369 U.S. 837 (1962). The argu· 
ment that a stable market may thus be maintained for security holders who wish to sell 
during the crisis is open to the answer given by the SEC to a similar argument made 
in support of repeal of § 16(b) of the Exchange Act. See note 49 supra. 
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ruptcy or insure or hasten consummation of a contemplated volun-
tary readjustment.94 
But apart from minor nuisance claims, which are de minimis, 
the so-called hostile or cool interests who are being bought out are 
likely to represent a substantial investment. They may have extra-
neous-and unlawful--designs on the enterprise,95 or they may be 
seeking the legitimate emoluments of control. But, except in the 
former case, the holders of such an investment are presumably also 
interested in either advocating or opposing reorganization, merger 
or liquidation programs because they think that doing so will pro-
tect or improve their investment and that of all other security 
holders of the same class. There is no reason why, a priori, the 
insiders' proposals for reorganization or merger or sale of assets 
must be deemed more advantageous to public security holders 
than the position taken by so-called hostile interests.96 Hence, there 
may be little reason from the public security holders' point of view 
to encourage the insider to buy out such hostile interests by letting 
him make a profit on the acquisition. Arguably, in some cases the 
public security holders might actually be better served if the in-
sider were discouraged from buying out such interests. 
However that may be, a rule denying an insider profits on the 
purchase of securities during such corporate crises does not pre-
clude him from purchasing such securities. If in fact he thinks it 
necessary, in order to protect his existing position, either to elimi-
nate a nuisance or to buy out a hostile claimant, he is still left free 
to do so. He is merely deprived of the profits in such a transaction 
and is treated as if he had loaned to the corporation the money thus 
used to purchase the hostile claims,97 a loan for which he may in 
appropriate cases acquire priority.98 
94 Ibid. Another suggestion, that the insider's purchases may improve public 
confidence in the credit of the enterprise at a time of crises [see Note, 62 HAR.v. L. REv. 
1391 (1949)], has been contradicted no less authoritatively than it has been asserted. 
See Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 151, 154-57 (1950). 
911 If such improper designs exist, e.g., looting or favoring corporations in which they 
have interests, appropriate remedies are available to public security holders. 
96 E.g., In re Franklin Bldg. Co., 178 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1949); In re Los 
Angeles Lumber Prod. Co., 46 F. Supp. 77, 82·83 (S.D. Cal. 1941). 
97 See In re Inland Gas Co., 187 F.2d 813 (6th Cir. 1951); Wing v. Dillingham, 
239 Fed. 54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 244 U.S. 654 (1917); cf. Testimony of Thomas G. 
Corcoran, Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56 and S. Res. 97, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6557 
(1934), indicating that in the case of an insider who was forced for extraneous reasons 
to sell within six months after he purchased "He would get his money out, but the 
profit goes to the corporation." 
98 Cf. Sanford Tool Co. v. Brown, 157 U.S. 312 (1895); Bramblet v. Commonwealth 
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Another principal objection to requiring an insider to ac-
count to his corporation and remaining security holders for profits 
from trading in its securities or otherwise dealing in them during 
a reorganization is that the seller to (or buyer from) the insider is 
in fact, if not always in law, likely to be the victim. Because of 
that, the suggestion is made that it would be improper to allow 
the corporation (and its remaining security holders) to acquire 
from the insider the profits which he took unfairly, not from the 
corporation, but from the persons dealing with him. Indeed the 
corporation has frequently been held liable to those from whom it 
has purchased its own securities for precisely the same kind of un-
fair treatment which the insider may extend to them when he 
purchases the corporation's securities-failure adequately to dis-
close information affecting the value of the securities involved.99 
Certainly neither insiders nor the corporation and its remain-
ing security holders are justified in victimizing those with whom 
they deal. Arguably, the corporation should not be allowed to pur-
chase its own securities at a discount when a recapitalization or 
merger or liquidation or the like is contemplated, because of the 
intrinsic infeasibility of enforcing a rule of full and adequate dis-
closure to, and fair dealing with, the selling security holders.100 But 
even if the interests of public investors should permit the corpora-
tion, after as full a disclosure as possible, freely to repurchase its 
own securities at a discount,101 it by no means follows that the in-
Land &: Lumber Co., 26 Ky. L. Rep. 1176, 83 S.W. 599 (Ct. App. 1904); Chouteau Ins. 
Co. v. Floyd, 74 Mo. 286, 291 (1881). See also Stuart v. Larson, 298 Fed. 223 (8th Cir. 
1924). 
99 Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
!!61 U.S. 885 (1959); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 
(N.D. III. 1952); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 348 III. App. 134, 108 
N.E.2d 493 (1952); Wood v. MacLean Drug Co., 266 Ill. App. 5 (1932); Macgill v. 
Macgill, 135 Md. !!84, 109 At!. 72 (1919); Ward La France Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943); 
22 SEC ANN. REP. 187-88 (1956); IO SEC ANN. REP. 176-77 (1944); Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 
1120, 1149-54 (1950); Note, 59 HARV. L. R.Ev. 769, 775-78 (1946). Contra, Gladstone v. 
Murray, 314 Mass. 584, 50 N.E.2d 958 (1943). Compare Conant, Duties of Disclosure of 
Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 53 (1960). 
100 See, e.g., 22 SEC ANN. REP. 187-88 (1956). 
101 See Gladstone v. Murray, 314 Mass. 584, 50 N.E.2d 958 (1943); Note, 59 HARv. L. 
REv. 769, 775-78 (1946). Compare United Gas Corp., 16 S.E.C. 531, 562-64 (1944); In re 
American 8: Foreign Power Co., 15 S.E.C. 293, 301-04 (1944); Electric Bond &: Share Co., 
IO S.E.C. 1 (1941); IO S.E.C. 1206 (1942); 13 S.E.C. 568 (1943); Engineers Pub. Serv. Co., 
4 S.E.C. 615 (1939), setting forth a procedure to protect public security holders when 
corporations repurchase their stock. See also § 23(c) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940, 54 Stat. 836, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(c) (1958); but cf. Martin v. American Potash Co., 
!!!! Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952), and Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1960). 
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sider should be entitled to the same freedom in making a purchase 
for himself. Thus, if a trustee should have purchased a fully in-
formed cestui's interest for the trust rather than for himself, or 
should in any event not have purchased the interest for himself 
because of a possible conflict of interest with the trust, he will be 
held accountable to the trust for his personally having made such a 
purchase.102 Similarly, to the extent that during a corporate crisis 
such a conflict exists, the fact that the insider purchased from fully 
informed security holders should, of course, not preclude him from 
being accountable to the remaining beneficiaries. 
Where the insider, in selling or buying corporate securities, 
has not made adequate disclosure, there are two types of situations 
to be considered. On the one hand, the buyer or seller may not be 
able to identify his transaction as having been consummated with 
the insider-which is frequently true where sales are made on a 
securities exchange--or he may fail to pursue his remedy against 
the insider for a variety of irrelevant reasons, e.g., the cost and time 
of litigation, difficulties of service of process or of proof, simple 
inertia, etc., or he may have no remedy.103 Where the victim thus 
fails to pursue the wrongdoing insider, there is certainly no reason 
to relieve the latter of such accounting to the corporation as he 
would have been required to make if he had dealt fairly with his 
buyer or seller. That it would have been improper for the corpo-
ration to have made the kind of purchase made by the insider does 
not entitle the insider to keep his ill-gotten gains or deny to the 
corporation the privilege of receiving them.104 
On the other hand, the buyer or seller may seek to recover from 
the insider. In that case, to the extent that the buyer or seller may 
be identified and can be found, there is no reason to deny him the 
opportunity to recover.105 Requiring the insider to account to the 
102 REs"I'ATEMENT, AGENCY § 388(c) (1958); REsTATEMENT, R.EsnnmON § 200 (1937); 
REsTATEMENT, TRUSTS §§ 170, comments j & k, 203, 206, comments h & i (1959); 2 ScoTT, 
TRUSTS §§ 203, 206 (2d ed. 1956). Compare L. A. Young Spring & Wire Co. v. Falls, 
307 Mich. 69, 102 N.W.2d 329 (1943). 
103 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). Compare 
Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders; Section 16 of the 
Securities Exchange Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133, 148-51 (1939). 
104 Where the insider is itself a publicly-owned holding company, its purchase of 
the subsidiary's securities poses the issue more dramatically, because the contest is in 
effect between public security holders of the subsidiary and the security holders of the 
parent [cf. In re Electric Power & Light Co., 176 F.2d 687, 692 (2d Cir. 1949)] but requires 
no different resolution of the question. 
105 Bond & Mortgage Guar. Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E. 721 (1952); see BALLANTINE, 
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corporation need not deny the victim the right to recover. On 
prevailing in any such litigation against the insider, or indeed, on 
consent of the insider in a settlement with the victim, the corpora-
tion to which the insider has turned over his profit can be required 
to pay the victim's claim to the extent of such profit.106 But to the 
extent that the insider's profit exceeds the damage to the selling 
security holder, or in the absence of a claimant to establish that he 
is wronged, there is no reason to permit the insider to keep profits 
which by assumption were obtained from improper dealings with 
third persons.107 Such is the conclusion reached by Congress and 
the courts in insolvency situations. It is difficult to see why any 
different conclusion is required where the corporate liquidation or 
reorganization crisis is the product of considerations other than in-
solvency. 
V. PERIPHERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
An attack on insider dealings in his corporation's securities108 
during corporate readjustment crises which strikes at conduct that 
is not merely identifiably wrongful or injurious, but which may 
well be innocent, argues for a sanction no more punitive than the 
traditional requirement of accountability for profits. This is not 
to deny that if in any particular case there is wrongful behavior or 
proven damage, a more substantial liability may be posited.109 
CORPORATIONS 216-17 {rev. ed. 1946); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS 701-02 (rev. ed. 1949); 
compare Leech, supra note 59, at 826-30. 
lOS It has been suggested that the action on behalf of the corporation be stayed while 
the rights of those who dealt with the insider are determined. See note 105 supra. 
Presumably this would require efforts to be made, at the corporation's initial expense, to 
ascertain the identity of such persons and inform them of their rights. 
101 It has also been suggested that the insider should be both accountable to his 
corporation and liable to the victimized seller. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1173-74 
{2d ed. 1961); Yourd, supra note 103, at 149 n.56; Comment, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1141-42 
(1950). To the extent that accountability for profits is required even though the corpora-
tion is not injured, it is difficult to see why, if the insider has no profits because he has 
compensated his victimized seller, the corporation should nevertheless recover the quondam 
profits. Cf. Hennessey v. Fein, 184 F. Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
108 The considerations governing limitations on dealings in their own corporations' 
securities suggest that pending mergers or acquisitions, insiders of all participating 
enterprises which are materially affected by such mergers or acquisitions should be 
precluded from dealing in securities of any of the participants, not merely of their own 
enterprise. Compare Regal v. Gulliver, [1942] 1 All E.R. 378 (H.L.), with Kaufman v. 
Wolfson, 153 F. Supp. 253 {S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
109 The distinction between a culpable breach of trust and mere divided loyalty 
[See Niles, Trustee Accountability in the Absence of Breach of Trust, 60 COLUM. L. 
REv. 141 (1960)] has not been rigorously observed in this area, as is apparent from the 
judicial and legislative imposition of the sanction of denial of compensation upon 
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Application of the rule of accountability for insiders' profits to 
dealings in contemplation of, or during the pendency of, voluntary 
reorganization or change-of-business crises, in contrast to the ex-
tension of the rule of section 16(b) to trading in the over-the-coun-
ter market,11° is not, as a matter of either history or policy, depend-
ent upon legislative authority. Regulation of the conduct of 
corporate insiders in their relationship with their corporation and 
its security holders is historically part of the business of courts of 
equity. Those courts initiated the requirement of accountability 
for profits from insiders' dealings in claims against their corpora-
tions in the context of insolvency long before legislation on the 
subject was contemplated or enacted. They can apply the principle 
with equal facility to an insider's dealings in any kind of security 
of his corporation in the context of corporate crises created other 
than by insolvency. Indeed, congressional action in the insolvency 
area and SEC action in utility holding company reorganizations 
may fairly be said to reflect a public policy to which the judiciary 
should give particular heed in developing rules in a :field which is 
a traditional domain of courts of equity.111 
fiduciaries who buy or sell securities during insolvency reorganization-on the ground 
that such transactions constitute a breach of trust, as a result of which the trustee 
should be denied compensation. See In re Republic Gas Corp., 35 F. Supp. 300, 303 
(S.D.N.Y. 1936); Testimony of Securities and Exchange Commissioner William O. 
Douglas, Hearings Before House Committee on the Judiciary, on H.R. 6439, Subsequently 
Amended and Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1937). On the other 
hand, such a distinction appears to be involved in the decision of the court of appeals 
in In re Nazareth Fairgrounds & Farmers' Mkt., Inc., 296 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. 
granted sub nom. Wolf v. Weinstein, 369 U.S. 837 (1962), although the formal issue in 
the case was whether an officer and a supervisory employee are persons who act "in a 
representative or fiduciary capacity" within the meaning of § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act. 
While the court concluded that they were not acting in a fiduciary capacity for purposes 
of § 249, it recognized that such persons owed fiduciary obligations to the corporation 
which extended to their dealing in its securities. To the extent that the court's opinion 
can be read to suggest only selective accountability for profits from such transactions, it 
is at odds with the rigorous rule of accountability embodied in earlier decisions. See notes 
10-12 supra. 
110 A rule thus designed to prescribe conduct in organized security markets straddling 
many states is appropriately a matter for national rather than local interest; and to the 
extent that such a rule is a command of the substantive law, and effective enforcement 
of such a rule rests heavily on the availability of published reports of insider trading, 
the problem requires legislative solution. In any event, the long history of unsuccessful 
efforts to obtain such legislation [See 2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 107, at 1152-65), including 
the current investigation being conducted by the SEC, may well justify, if not require, 
judicial reluctance to act without implementing legislation. 
111 See Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. Iuv. 4, 12-16 
(1936), and compare SEC PROTECTIVE CoMMIITEE STUDY, pt. VIII, at 2!11 (19!!7): "The 
judicial rule, as bearing on bankruptcy reorganizations, is now embodied in Chapter X 
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To be sure, there may be problems in applying the prophylactic 
principle in particular cases or in delineating all the kinds of cor-
porate crises in which the principle should govern insiders' be-
havior. Thus, not every formal merger or acquisition may consti-
tute so fundamental a change in the business or structure of both 
the corporate parties to it so as to require invoking the principle 
for all of the insiders involved.112 Nor can a corporation whose 
assets have been sold be said to be equally in a state of crisis when 
it has reinvested 80 percent of the proceeds as it is when it has not 
reinvested any of the proceeds or when it has reinvested only 20 
percent of the proceeds. Similarly, recapitalization or merger or 
liquidation of an enterprise may have been in contemplation or 
the subject of negotiations to a greater or lesser extent, or predict-
able with varying degrees of probability, for long periods of time 
or on many previous occasions before actual consummation; and 
in any given case it may be difficult to determine whether it was 
sufficiently imminent to justify application of the prophylactic 
principle to the insider transactions involved.113 No less difficult 
problems may arise in prescribing the remedy for insider trans-
actions in violation of the principle during a conceded corporate 
crisis. Thus, when only the insider's purchase or sale occurs 
during, or in anticipation of, the crisis, questions may exist as to 
how to make the insider account for the unrealized portion of the 
profit or for only the realized portion which may be attributable 
to the crisis. 
But courts exercising equity jurisdiction lack neither the 
power nor the ingenuity to determine when a merger or liquid-
ation may reasonably be said to be in contemplation or otherwise 
to define the contours of the corporate crises to which the rule 
should apply.114 Nor are they powerless to fashion appropriate 
of the Act. But other areas of reorganization remain unaffected, except as they may be 
embraced by further judicial adoption of the fiduciary principles." 
112 E.g., merger into, or acquisition by, the Ford Motor Company of a small 
supplier of parts may constitute a fundamental transition for the latter (and thus 
require its insiders and possibly Ford's insiders to refrain from dealing in its stock) 
but not for Ford. 
113 In this connection, it may be noted that during prolonged insolvency re• 
organizations comparable negotiations may occur and lapse many times, but the 
prophylactic rules of chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act and of related cases govern 
insiders' securities transactions during the entire reorganization. 
1H In Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304- (1950), the Court left ajar, 
if not open, the question whether pre-bankruptcy purchases of claims made when 
liquidation was plainly imminent or with a view to affecting the initiation or re-
38 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
remedies for insider dealing on each such occasion.115 If, on the 
merits, the prophylactic principle should otherwise be invoked for 
the protection of public investors during the pendency of mergers 
or change-of-business crises, the problem of defining the outer 
limits of the principle's applicability or of prescribing a remedy 
for the occasional difficult case should not preclude judicial appli-
cation of that principle. And the historic ability of courts of equity 
jurisdiction to cut the suit to fit the cloth suggests that the judicial 
process may be more appropriate than legislation for thus adapting 
the principle to new contexts. 
organization proceedings would result in fully enforceable claims (338 U.S. at 315), a 
question with which it may be noted the SEC has wrestled inconclusively under the 
Holding Company Act. See Middle W. Corp., 27 S.E.C. 195, 224-25 (1947); Cities Serv. 
Corp., 26 S.E.C. 678, 694-95 (1947). The problem is whether to delineate the tainted pre-
reorganization period by some absolute standard-such as the six-month period which 
• § 16(b) of the Exchange Act offers-or to let a more selective and possibly subjective 
standard-such as whether the insider knew or reasonably should have known that a 
merger, recapitalization or liquidation was sought or would soon have to be carried 
out-test the propriety of the transactions. To the extent that compliance with the 
latter standard will be determined by inference from the proximity of the insider's 
transactions to the initiation or reorganization or merger negotiations or the like, it 
will, of course, approach the absolute standard. 
1111 Thus, if the insider acquired securities long before a merger or recapitalization 
was considered, and they have increased in value over the years, the fact that he sells 
them during the pendency of merger negotiations or immediately preceding the 
recapitalization need not deny him the increment in value up to the time the merger 
or recapitalization became a realistic possibility. His accountability would be only for 
the portion of the profits generated in anticipation of the merger or recapitalization. 
Compare rule 16(b)·6 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78p(b) (1958). Similarly, if the insider purchases securities at a discount after a sale 
of assets and while the corporation is looking for a new business, the fact that he does 
not sell the securities after the corporation acquires the new business need not preclude 
accountability for the amount of the discount. It is not foreign to courts of equity to 
require that securities be turned in to the corporation at cost, or if this is impracticable 
or not feasible, that the insider be required to account as if he had profited by at least 
the amount of the discount. Compare, e.g., Amen v. Black, 234 F.2d 12 (10th Cir.), 
cert. granted, .352 U.S. 889 (1956), remanded for dismissal by agreement, 355 U.S. 600 
(1958); Bemer v. Equitable Office Bldg., 175 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1949); Ashman v. 
Miller, 101 F.2d 85 (6th Cir, 1939); Electric Power 8e Light Co., 33 S.E.C. 348, 355-59 
(1952). 
